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Blackwater Rising: The Legal Issues 
Raised by the Unprecedented 
Privatization of U.S. Military Functions 
ROBERT D. PELTZ* 
 The Army has used civilian contractors to provide sup-
plies and services to its forces in the field since the Revolu-
tionary War. These early contractors fed the cavalry’s 
horses and transported supplies. Over the years, the role of 
the civilian contractor has dramatically evolved. Following 
the Vietnam War and the end of the draft, there has been an 
ever-increasing privatization of functions previously per-
formed by the military. 
 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which began in re-
sponse to the September 11 attacks and have only recently 
started to come to a formal end, have significantly acceler-
ated this process. As a result, by 2010 the number of con-
tractors in these battle zones began to exceed the number of 
U.S. troops. 
 This massive privatization of functions previously car-
ried out by the military has also resulted in an actual re-
definition of their roles. Private contractors now perform 
many jobs that were formerly the responsibility of uniformed 
personnel, including those in forward battlefield positions as 
well as in active combat. This significant change in role has 
been accompanied by a corresponding rise in deaths and in-
juries for contractor employees, so that they now surpass 
those sustained by military personnel. 
 The redefinition of the civilians’ role in battle has raised 
many new legal issues, for which there was very limited 
prior relevant precedent. In the civil context, these issues 
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include the applicability of the political question doctrine to 
tort cases arising on the battlefield; contractor immunity un-
der the Feres doctrine, the government contractor defense 
and the so-called combatant activities exception; the appli-
cation of the state secrets doctrine and the enforceability of 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Legal ques-
tions also arise in the criminal sphere, such as the liability 
of civilian employees for breaches of local laws as well as 
the Military Code of Justice and the extra-territorial juris-
diction of U.S. courts to hear cases arising from alleged 
criminal acts occurring in overseas war zones. 
 As a result, the federal courts have been left to struggle 
with many new and complex questions raised by these 
changed civilian roles, relationships and functions without 
any significant framework for guidance. Consequently, some 
cases have dragged on for over a decade, while others have 
reached diametrically opposite results, which are often not 
logically capable of reconciliation. 
 If there was ever an area of overwhelmingly unique fed-
eral interest, it is the subject of military contractors’ legal 
liabilities and responsibilities in war zones. The present 
patchwork quilt of remedies is neither adequate nor fair and 
is totally lacking in the predictability, which the law should 
provide to its citizens. Too often the families of civilian men 
and women, who died while serving in the roles traditionally 
performed by soldiers in war time, have been denied any ef-
fective remedy for their loved one’s sacrifices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the Revolutionary War, the Army has used civilian con-
tractors to supply and service its forces.1 These early contractors fed 
the cavalry’s horses and transported supplies.2 Over the years, the 
role of civilian contractors in American wars has dramatically 
evolved. After the Vietnam War and draft ended, there has been an 
ever-increasing privatization of functions that were previously per-
formed by military personnel.3 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which began in response to 
the September 11 attacks and continue today, have significantly 
 
 1 U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, AMC-P 715–18, AMC CONTRACTS 
AND CONTRACTORS SUPPORTING MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1-1 (June 26, 2000). 
 2 Colonel Ronda G. Urey, Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield 8–13 (Mar. 
18, 2005) (M.A. research paper, U.S. Army War College) (on file with U.S. Army 
War College). 
 3 See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 
A.F. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“This began to change during the Vietnam war and 
had continued exponentially since that time.”). 
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accelerated this process.4 Traditional military jobs from mess hall 
cooks, to convoy drivers, to security personnel have been increas-
ingly taken over by private contractors.5 As a result, by 2010 the 
number of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq began exceeding the 
number of U.S. troops.6 
This massive privatization of military functions has also resulted 
in an actual re-definition of their roles. Private contractors now per-
form many functions that were formerly the responsibility of uni-
formed personnel, including those in forward battlefield positions as 
well as in active combat.7 This redefinition of the civilians’ role in 
battle has raised many new legal issues, both civil and criminal, for 
which there has often been a lack of established precedent.8 
Consequently, some of the cases arising out of the use of such 
contractors have bounced around from court to court and have taken 
over a decade to resolve.9 Other cases have reached disparate and 
irreconcilable outcomes.10 As a result, the families of civilian men 
and women, who died while serving in the roles traditionally per-
formed by soldiers in war time, have too often been denied any ef-
fective remedy for their loved one’s sacrifices.11 
 
 4 See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 5 See Urey, supra note 2, at 3; see also MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE OF 
REP. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV. REFORM, 110TH CONG., MEMORANDUM 
ON ADDITIONAL INFO. FOR HEARING ON PRIV. SEC. CONTRACTORS, 1–2 (2007). 
 6 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, 
TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING, CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING 
RISKS 18 (2011). 
 7 See Deborah C. Kidwell, Public War Private Fight? The United States and 
Private Military Companies 3 (Combat Studies Institute Press, Paper No. 12, 
2005), available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-
institute/csi-books/kidwell.pdf. 
 8 See id. at 3–4. 
 9 See, e.g., U.S. v. Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d 52, 54, 73 (D.D.C. 2019) (ana-
lyzing how the case against a Blackwater employee who started a firefight that 
injured or killed thirty-one Iraqi civilians lasted over a decade). 
 10 Compare Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that tort claims arising from attack on military convoy against military contractor 
were not barred by political question doctrine), with Whitaker v. KBR, 444 F. 
Supp. 2d 1277, 1281–82 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that tort claims arising from 
attack on military convoy were barred by political question doctrine). 
 11 See Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011 
WL 237840, at *1, *5, *8 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011) (the families of Blackwater 
employees, who were brutally tortured and murdered on the job in Fallujah, were 
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Putting aside for another day the wisdom of this level of privat-
ization and lack of institutional control,12 many legal questions re-
main now that we are at this point. These issues include the legal 
liability of contractors for injuries to their employees, third persons, 
and soldiers; the rules and regulations governing both contractors 
and their employees; and the potential criminal liability of the civil-
ian employees for both breaches of local laws as well as the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.13 
As observed by the Fourth Circuit, in one case that stretched on 
for over ten years, “Courts—including this Court—have struggled 
with how to treat these contractors under the current legal frame-
work, which protects government actors but not private contractors 
from lawsuits in some cases.”14 
Although formal American military involvement in ongoing 
hostilities in Iraq is significantly less today, while U.S. troops left 
Afghanistan in the summer of 2021, these legal issues remain im-
portant, since the continued use of contractors to support U.S. inter-
ests in hot spots around the world only continues to grow.15 
A. The History of Military Contractors in the United States 
During the Revolutionary War, early contractors played the lim-
ited role of feeding the cavalry’s horses and transporting supplies.16 
 
denied any recovery because they could not pay the extensive arbitration fees 
called for in the deceased’s employment contracts). 
 12 Many sources provide further discussion on the policy issues raised by the 
increased reliance upon private contractors. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, 
Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 34–38 (2001); JEREMY 
SCAHILL, BLACKWATER, THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL 
MERCENARY ARMY 61–63 (2008); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Pri-
vatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and De-
mocracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 993–95 (2005); Urey, supra note 2, at 8–13. 
 13 See Kidwell, supra note 7, at 51; Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 33–34. 
 14 In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 15 See Gordon L. Campbell, Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Pay-
ing Civilians to Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them, 
Presentation to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (Jan. 27-28, 
2000) available at http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE00/Campbell00.html; see also 
DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications, DMDC https://dwp.
dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports (last visited Oct. 7, 
2021). 
 16 See Urey, supra note 2, at 1. 
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By the time of the Civil War, sutlers who accompanied the troops 
sold non-military merchandise to the Union soldiers.17 In World 
War II, civilians fulfilled a variety of non-combat roles both at home 
and in combat theaters, including scientific, engineering, and con-
struction duties.18 The Korean War saw extensive use of civilians 
performing stevedoring as well as road and rail maintenance func-
tions.19 In Vietnam, civilians were involved in construction, base 
operations, transportation, supply, and technical support activities.20 
During the first Gulf War, civilian contractors provided mainte-
nance and support for high-tech equipment as well as more mundane 
water, food, and construction services.21 
However, the role of contractors transformed dramatically 
throughout both post 9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
massive privatization of traditional military functions not only in-
creased the number of civilians involved in our country’s war ef-
forts, but resulted in an actual re-definition of their roles:22 
“Private contractors now perform many functions 
that were formerly the responsibility of uniformed 
personnel disciplined under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ). Moreover, contractors cur-
rently deploy to more forward (battlefield) positions 
than ever before, and a large number of contractors 
work outside active theaters. Many [private military 
contractors] participate in active combat. Logistician 
Joe Fortner observes, “contractors are not replacing 
force structure, they are becoming force structure.”23 
 
 17 Campbell, supra note 15.  
 18 Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-
Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 367, 382 (2006).  
 19 Campbell, supra note 15. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id.; Peters, supra note 18, at 382; William Spyro Speros, Friend-of-a-
Friendly Fire: A Future Tort Issue of Contractors on the Battlefield, 35 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 297, 300–01 (2006). 
 22 See Campbell, supra note 15. 
 23 See Kidwell, supra note, 7 at 3; see also Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 
22–23. 
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This change in role has also resulted in the proliferation of civil-
ian contractors providing security functions.24 As noted in one 
House Oversight Committee Staff Report at the height of the wars: 
Under direct contracts with the government and sub-
contracts with reconstruction firms, private security 
contractors perform a wide range of security func-
tions, including: site security for military bases, the 
Green Zone, and critical infrastructure; cash 
transport; weapons demolition; surveillance; the 
guarding of key personnel, contractors, and civilian 
dignitaries; armed escorts for supply convoys; intel-
ligence gathering; psychological warfare; covert op-
erations; and the training of Iraqi security forces.25 
In addition to Blackwater (subsequently renamed Xe and now 
Academi), companies such as KBR, Halliburton, Aegis, DynCorp, 
Erinys, and Triple Canopy have received a substantial portion of the 
hundreds of billions of dollars in government funds,26 spent on wag-
ing the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.27 The use of private contractors 
to provide security services has become pervasive and unsupervised. 
A Staff Report from the House Committee on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform, during the midst of the post war reconstruction pe-
riod, observed that the Administration did not even know how many 
private security contractor employees were operating in Iraq; some 
estimates ranged as high as 48,000 personnel from 181 security 
firms, which is the equivalent of three U.S. Army divisions.28 
 During the first Gulf War, one in thirty-six people deployed in 
the war zone were private contractors.29 By 2010, the number of 
 
 24 See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND 
GOV. REFORM, supra note 5, at 1–3. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Jason Ukman, Ex-Blackwater Firm Gets Name Change, Again, Wash. Post 
(Dec. 12, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washing-
ton/post/ex-blackwater-firm-gets-a-name-change-again/2011/12/12/gIQAXf4Yp
O_blog.html. 
 27 See HEIDI M. PETERS & SOFIA PLAGAKIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., DEP’T OF 
DEF. CONTRACTOR AND TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: 2007-2018, 
R44116 at 2 (2019). 
 28 Id. at 2. 
 29 Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 7. 
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contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq had swelled to over 260,000, 
exceeding the number of U.S. troops.30Although the Obama Admin-
istration began to significantly draw down military fighting forces 
from both Iraq and Afghanistan,31 many contractors have remained 
as those wars have continued under the Trump and Biden Admin-
istrations.32 
According to the Department of Defense (“DOD”), at the end of 
2017, the last year that U.S. troop levels were publicly reported, 
there were 23,659 contractors working for the U.S. military in Iraq 
and Afghanistan compared to just 11,100 soldiers.33 The disparity 
in relative numbers has grown even greater as the number of troops 
being drawn down has continued as reflected by published news re-
ports of further decreases in troop levels accompanied by corre-
sponding increases in the number of contractors to replace them.34 
As a result of this ongoing process, over the past two decades 
private contractors have become the United States’ largest war part-
ner,35 prompting Blackwater36 author Jeremy Scahill to quip on The 
Daily Show, “The coalition of the willing, has now become the co-
alition of the billing.”37 
Not surprisingly, this increase in the role played by private con-
tractors has been accompanied by a corresponding rise in deaths and 
 
 30 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, supra 
note 3, at 18. 
 31 PETERS & PLAGAKIS, supra note 27, at 2. 
 32 See Deborah Avant, If The U.S. Withdraws From Afghanistan, Will Its Mil-
itary Contractors Stay? That’s Not Clear, Wash. Post (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/28/if-us-withdraws-afghani-
stan-will-its-military-contractors-stay-thats-not-clear/. 
 33 PETERS & PLAGAKIS, supra note 27, at 8. 
 34 See id at 3; Thomas Gibbons-Neff & Mujib Mashal, U.S. to Withdraw 
About 7,000 Troops from Afghanistan, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/afghanistan-troop-with-
drawal.html (estimating 14,000 U.S. troops to be stationed in Afghanistan at the 
time). 
 35 Urey, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 36 See SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 67. 
 37 The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Cent. television broadcast Apr. 
19, 2007). 
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injuries to their personnel.38 In 2009, contractor employee deaths in 
Iraq surpassed those of the U.S. military for the first time.39 This gap 
has continued to widen during the ensuing troop drawdown.40 
However, the increase in injuries and deaths to contractor em-
ployees is not just a result of the drawdown of military troops. In 
2011, during a “surge” of combat fighters, 418 American soldiers 
died in Afghanistan.41 During this same time period, 430 employees 
of U.S. contractors were reported killed according to statistics made 
available by government sources.42 The increase in the number of 
injuries and deaths to contractor employees is a direct consequence 
of their changing roles and their assumption of higher risk functions 
previously handled by military personnel.43 
B. The Public’s Awareness of the Role of Military Contractors 
Most Americans first became aware of the private civilian pres-
ence working with the military in Iraq as a result of the gruesome 
ambush of four Blackwater security personnel, who escorted a con-
voy of food supplies in Fallujah on March 31, 2004.44 Up until this 
time, news on the Iraq war typically identified non-military person-
nel simply as civilian workers or contractors, leading most Ameri-
cans to believe these individuals were unarmed engineers or truck 
drivers.45 The Blackwater security personnel, however, consisted of 
two former Army Rangers, an ex-Navy Seal, and an Army Special 
Ops graduate.46 
On that fateful day, the convoy became lost and drove through 
the center of Fallujah.47 While stopped in traffic, two unarmored ve-
hicles occupied by the Blackwater security contractors were 
 
 38 See generally Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors,  N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 12, 2012) https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage-
9C0DE7D91F31F931A25751C0A9649D8B63.html. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See PETERS & PLAGAKIS, supra note 27, at 1. 
 44 SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 66. 
 45 See id. at 66–67. 
 46 Id. at 152–54. 
 47 Id. at 156–58. 
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ambushed by grenades and machine gun fire.48 A mob of attackers 
quickly surrounded the vehicles and pulled the one survivor out 
through the window, stoning him to death.49 After dismembering all 
their bodies and dragging them through the city, two were hung up 
for hours on a bridge over the Euphrates River.50 The grizzly scene 
was then broadcast for the whole world to see.51 
The families of the four Blackwater employees subsequently 
brought suit against their employer claiming negligence in their 
training, weapons supply, intelligence support, and manning as well 
as for fraud.52 Among the specific allegations raised by the families 
was the claim that Blackwater failed to provide the security person-
nel with armored vehicles,53 while only supplying two men rather 
than three for each vehicle so that they were missing critical tail 
gunners.54 The complaint also alleged that Blackwater neglected to 
even provide the men with maps, while starting the convoys imme-
diately upon their  arrival in the country, rather than allowing them 
the promised twenty-one-day advance period in order to reconnoiter 
the area and become familiar with the convoy routes and potential 
threats.55 A Staff Report of the Committee on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform of the House of Representatives, subsequently 
found evidence to support their charges.56 
Nevertheless, the litigation brought by the families ended with-
out any recovery.57 The families were required to arbitrate their 
claims based upon a provision in their decedents’ employment 
 
 48 Id. at 158. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 159.  
 51 See SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 166; Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, 
LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805 (E.D.N.C. 2005); see also Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi, 
The Unwilling Witness, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.ny-
times.com/2013/03/17/magazine/unwilling-witness-at-falluja.html. 
 52 Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 803. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors: Mem-
orandum before the Comm. On Oversight and Gov. Reform , supra note 11, at 3–
4. 
 57 See Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011 
WL 237840 at *4 (E.D.N.C. Jan 21, 2011). 
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contracts, which called for the parties to split the costs of arbitra-
tion.58 The arbitration was eventually dismissed due to the families’ 
failure to pay for their share of the costs of the arbitration, which 
they contended they were unable to afford.59 Subsequently, the dis-
missal was confirmed by a North Carolina federal district court.60 
Blackwater was back in the news several years later in another 
highly publicized incident, which again demonstrated the shortcom-
ings of existing U.S. law to adequately govern the changing role of 
military contractors in modern warfare.61 This time four of its con-
tractors were involved in a Wild West type shoot out while guarding 
a State Department motorcade on September 16, 2007.62 The gun 
battle took place in a predominantly Sunni neighborhood of West 
Baghdad, in which fourteen Iraqi civilians were killed and another 
seventeen wounded.63 
The incident prompted the Iraqi Interior Minister to revoke 
Blackwater’s operating license, only to learn that his action had no 
effect on the company’s legal ability to continue working in Iraq.64 
Despite repeated angry denunciations from then Iraqi Prime Minis-
ter Nouri al Maliki accusing Blackwater of numerous incidents of 
wrongdoing, ranging from the killing of innocent citizens to helping 
political figures escape from jail, Blackwater continued to operate 
in Iraq.65 
At the time, the legal ability of the United States to handle such 
incidents was unclear as a result of which the criminal cases against 
the four dragged on for eleven years with the American courts facing 
numerous legal and jurisdictional hurdles.66 Westlaw lists numerous 
 
 58 Id. at *2; see also infra Section II.E. 
 59 Id. at *3-4. 
 60 See Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC., 2011 WL 237840, at *11–12. 
 61 See United States v. Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 45, 53(D.D.C. 2019). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 53, 73. 
 64 Sabrina Tavernise, Iraq Ends Security Company’s License After 8 Deaths, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/17/world/mid-
dleeast/17cnd-iraq.html. 
 65 See Jim Michaels, Iraq Seeking to Ban Contractor After Civilians Shot, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2007, at 9A; Leila Fadel et al., Iraq Wants U.S. Firm Out, 
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2007, at 9A; John Daniszewski & Tarek El-Tablawy, 
Maliki Assails U.S. Security Setup, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 24, 2007, at 16A. 
 66 See Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 79. 
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opinions in these cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia,67 prior to their final resolution in the summer of 2020 with the 
sentencing of the four defendants and the denial of their last motions 
for new trial.68 Even then the cases were not finally closed until De-
cember of 2020, when the four contractors were pardoned by Presi-
dent Trump as part of a highly controversial batch of pre-Christmas 
pardons on his way out of office.69 
There are several important reasons for the difficulties U.S. 
courts have faced in resolving these issues. At the top of the list is 
the lack of a workable comprehensive statutory framework for the 
resolution of the multitude of civil claims, which have arisen from 
the increased exposure of the employees of military contractors to 
the hazards of wartime hostilities.70 As discussed in the next section, 
much of the existing law was developed during World War II and 
the Vietnam War, significantly different conflicts fought under 
markedly different circumstances in which civilians played a dra-
matically smaller and more isolated role.71 As a result, certain prin-
ciples have developed in a historical context, which seem to make 
little logical sense today. 
Due to this lack of established relevant common law precedent, 
coupled with the absence of any comprehensive Congressional treat-
ment of these issues, the district courts have been left to struggle 
with many new and complex questions raised by these changed ci-
vilian roles, relationships, and functions without much of a frame-
work for guidance.72 As a result, many cases have reached 
 
 67 See, e.g., Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, 549 U.S. 1260 
(2007); U.S. v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Est. of Abtan v. Blackwa-
ter Lodge and Training Center, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 68 See U.S. v. Slatten, No. 1:14-cr-107-RCL, 2020 WL 4530729 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 6, 2020). 
 69 See Maggie Haberman & Michael Schmidt, Trump Pardons Two Russia 
Inquiry Figures and Blackwater Guards, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/22/us/politics/trump-pardons.html. 
 70 Greta S. Milligan, The Defense Base Act: An Outdated Law and its Current 
Implications, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 434 (2009). 
 71 Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 72 In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2014). 
2021] BLACKWATER RISING 175 
 
diametrically opposite results, which are oftentimes not logically ca-
pable of reconciliation.73 
Although formal American military involvement in the ongoing 
hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan has wound down significantly 
from its highwater point, the legal issues from the extensive use of 
military contractors in these wars still exists today. U.S. military 
personnel are presently deployed in over 150 countries throughout 
the world, some of which involve active hostilities.74 
The patchwork quilt of existing remedies, which were often cre-
ated in a much earlier time to address significantly different circum-
stances, has produced results that are too often neither adequate nor 
fair and lacking in the predictability the law should provide to its 
citizens.75 Accordingly, as discussed in more detail in the Conclu-
sion to this article, this is an area which clearly calls out for a com-
prehensive Congressional solution.76 
I. STATUTORY COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
A. Defense Base Act 
Strange as it may seem, the main statutory source for determin-
ing the claims of contractors against their employers arising out of 
the wars in Afghanistan, a landlocked mountainous country, and 
Iraq, a virtually landlocked country with vast deserts, is the Long-
shoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).77 
It is hard to imagine better evidence of the inadequacies of existing 
law to properly govern such claims. 
In 1927, Congress promulgated the LHWCA to provide a system 
of uniform federal compensation for injuries to non-seamen 
 
 73 See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2012); Potts v. 
Dyncorp Int’l, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Lessin v. Kellogg 
Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 
12, 2006). 
 74 See DEP’T OF DEF., DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., NO. OF MIL. AND DOD 
APPROPRIATED FUND (APF) CIVILIAN PERS. PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED DEC. 2020 
(Feb. 5, 2021), https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-
reports. 
 75 See Fisher, 667 F.3d at 610. 
 76 See discussion infra Conclusion. 
 77 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. 
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maritime workers, who at the time were not entitled to recover under 
state workers’ compensation systems.78 As with land-based work-
ers’ compensation systems, the LHWCA provides a limited sched-
ule of benefits for covered injuries that do not require a showing of 
fault in exchange for providing the employer with tort immunity:79 
[T]he statutory scheme represents a “legislated com-
promise between the interests of employees and the 
concerns of employers.” In other words, “there is a 
quid pro quo.” . . . “In return for the guarantee of 
compensation, the employees surrender common-
law remedies against their employers for work-re-
lated injuries,” while the employers gain “immunity 
from employee tort suits.”80 
Prior to the United States formal entry into World War II, Pres-
ident Franklin Roosevelt supported Great Britain’s war effort by the 
adoption of his Lend-Lease Program,81 in which American arms 
were traded to England in exchange for leases on various military 
bases throughout the world.82 In order to provide a compensation 
system for American civilian employees working on these bases ac-
quired from England, Congress enacted the Defense Base Act 
(“DBA”),83 which extended the provisions of the LHWCA to these 
employees.84 
Following the United States formal entry into World War II, 
American defense bases greatly proliferated throughout the world.85 
Initial makeshift arrangements with contractors to provide workers 
compensation coverage on a voluntary basis proved to be unsuccess-
ful.86 Accordingly, in response to the resulting “uneconomic and 
 
 78 See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917). 
 79 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. 
 80 Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations 
omitted). 
 81 WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE 
HISTORY OF AMERICA 1932-1972, 278–83 (Little, Brown & Co. 1974). 
 82 Id. 
 83 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654. 
 84 Republic Aviation Corp. v. Lowe, 69 F. Supp. 473, 474–75 (S.D.N.Y. 
1946). 
 85 See S. Rep. No. 85-1886, at 3 (1958). 
 86 Id. at 4. 
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discriminatory” treatment of overseas workers in World War II due 
to the limited coverage of the DBA as originally enacted, Congress 
expanded its application through the 1942 War Hazards Act to, 
“provide statutory coverage for all employees of contractors en-
gaged in work outside the United States wherever located . . . .”87 
The DBA was then amended again in 1958, expanding the defi-
nition of “public work” to include “service contracts” to remove the 
limitation imposed by several earlier cases restricting its application 
to construction projects of a fixed or permanent nature.88 The 
amendment also broadened coverage to include persons employed 
overseas by “welfare and morale organizations”, such as the Red 
Cross and USO, while also applying it to non-citizen employees.89 
Following additional amendments over the years, by the time of 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Defense Base Act90 had 
extended coverage to claims arising from injury or death to employ-
ees engaged in any employment: 
(1) at any military, air, or naval base acquired after 
January 1, 1940, by the United States from any for-
eign government; or 
(2) upon any lands occupied or used by the United 
States for military or naval purposes in any Territory 
or possession outside the continental United 
States . . . or 
(3) upon any public work in any Territory or posses-
sion outside the continental United States . . . under 
the contract of a contractor . . . with the United 
States . . . or 
(4) under a contract entered into with the United 
States or any executive department . . . or agency 
thereof . . . or subcontract or subordinate contract 
 
 87 Ross v. DynCorp, 362 F. Supp. 2d 344, 355 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 85-1886, at 4 (1958)). 
 88 See Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 48, 48–49 (9th Cir. 1966) 
(applying DBA to a contract between the Air Force and a private contractor to 
transport military personnel from California to Vietnam). 
 89 Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 355. 
 90 See 42 U.S.C. §1651(a). 
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with respect to such contract, where such contract is 
to be performed outside the continental United States 
and at places not within the areas described in sub-
paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subdivision, for the pur-
pose of engaging in public work91 . . . or 
(5) under a contract approved and financed by the 
United States or any executive department . . . or 
agency thereof . . . or any subcontract or subordinate 
contract with respect to such contract, where such 
contract is to be performed outside the continental 
United States, under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 
. . . [or] any successor Act . . . .92 
In reliance upon its legislative history, courts have liberally con-
strued the types of activities coming within the reach of the DBA, 
and have thus continuously expanded its coverage in the years fol-
lowing its adoption.93 As a result, cases have held it applicable to 
injuries and deaths occurring on military bases in Puerto Rico due 
to defective equipment,94 aircrew providing aviation support ser-
vices for the Colombian army’s drug eradication services under U.S. 
contract,95 test pilots crashing on take offs from Pacific Islands,96 
contractors killed by other drunken contractors in Iraq,97 and even a 
Pan Am employee killed in a motor scooter accident in the West 
Indies.98 
 
 91 The term “public work” under this statute, includes “operations under ser-
vice contracts and projects in connection with the national defense or with war 
activities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1651(b)(1). 
 92 42 U.S.C. §1651(a). The Mutual Security Act of 1954, was repealed and 
superseded by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 353 
(citing Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 642, 75 Stat. 424 
(codified at U.S.C. § 2151 (1961))). 
 93 See, e.g., Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 355. 
 94 See, e.g., Davila-Perez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 465, 469 
(1st Cir. 2000). 
 95 See, e.g., Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 347, 357. 
 96 See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. Lowe, 69 F. Supp. 472, 473, 480 
(S.D.N.Y. 1946). 
 97 See, e.g., Pope v. Palmer, No. 10-13285, 2011 WL 4502859, at *1, *8 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 28, 2011). 
 98 See O’Keeffe v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 338 F.2d 319, 320–21 (5th 
Cir. 1964). 
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Courts have not been so liberal, however, in extending the defi-
nition of an “employer” entitled to tort immunity under the Act.99 
While in a few instances the DBA has been applied to closely related 
entities, such as a “divisional unit” of the plaintiff’s employer100 or 
a joint venture,101 the mere affiliation between companies with sep-
arate corporate structures is not sufficient to confer tort immunity.102 
Where the DBA is silent, courts look to the LHWCA to fill in 
the blanks.103 Therefore, since the DBA fails to define the scope of 
“injury or death to any employee engaged in employment,” courts 
have relied upon the definition of “injury” under the LHWCA, 
which it defines as “accidental injury or death arising out of and in 
the course of employment, and such occupational disease . . . and 
includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed 
against an employee because of his employment.”104 
The benefits provided to injured military contractors and their 
families, in the event of death by the LHWCA, are relatively modest 
and a mere fraction of what they would be expected to receive in a 
civil tort suit. Under the statutory schedule a covered individual will 
receive 66 2/3% of their average weekly wage (“AWW”) for a spec-
ified number of weeks depending upon the nature of their injury.105 
For example, the loss of an arm equals 312 weeks of benefits, the 
loss of a leg 288 weeks, and the loss of an eye 160 weeks.106 Disfig-
urement, no matter how severe, is compensated by a total of $7,500, 
but only if it is likely to handicap the employee in obtaining or main-
taining employment.107 
Regardless of the employee’s actual wage, however, the AWW 
for purposes of these calculation cannot exceed 200% of the 
 
 99 See, e.g., Brokaw v. Boeing Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1101 (N.D. Ill. 
2015). 
 100 See Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 347 n.1. 
 101 See Haas v. 653 Leasing Co., 425 F. Supp. 1305, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 
(finding that a joint venture and its participants were the plaintiff’s employer for 
purposes of the LHWCA). 
 102 See, e.g., Brokaw, 137 F. Supp. 3d at 1100–01. 
 103 See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610–11 (5th Cir. 2012); Pope 
v. Palmer, No. 10-13285, 2011 WL 4502859, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2011). 
 104 Fisher, 667 F.3d at 610–11. 
 105 See 33 U.S.C. § 908(a)–(c). 
 106 Id. § 908(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(5). 
 107 See id. § 908(c)(20). 
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“national average weekly wage” as determined by the Secretary of 
Labor.108 The most recent average announced by the Department of 
Labor for the 12-month period beginning October 1, 2021 is 
$863.49, thereby making the maximum AWW under the Act 
$1,726.98.109 
Clearly, the risks and types of injuries to which the typical long-
shoreman is exposed while working at a U.S. port are hardly similar 
or analogous to those faced by contractors working on a battlefield. 
The extreme nature of such risks also factors into the significantly 
higher compensation military contractors are paid than the typical 
longshoreman unloading cargo at a domestic port.110 According to 
testimony provided during various House oversight hearings, the av-
erage daily pay for a Blackwater employee in the war zone was $600 
per day at the high point of the Iraqi War.111 Other sources have 
given estimates of between $500 to $1500 per day.112 
Therefore, utilizing the scheme established by the LHWCA to 
compensate the injured military contractor, or his family in case of 
death, not only fails to take into account the literal life-threatening 
risks faced on a daily basis and the severe nature of many resulting 
battlefield injuries, but also shortchanges them by utilizing an arti-
ficially low average weekly wage that often bears little resemblance 
to their actual pay. 
B. Exclusivity of Remedy 
The broad immunity provided by the DBA to military contrac-
tors is a product of both the Act itself and its adoption of the 
 
 108 33 U.S.C. § 906(b). 
 109 National Average Weekly Wages (NAWW), Minimum and Maximum Com-
pensation Rates, and Annual October Increases (Section 10(f)), U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/NAWWinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2021). 
 110 See Janet Farley, The Benefits of Working Overseas as a Contractor, 
CLEARANCE JOBS (Apr. 3, 2011), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2011/04/03/
the-benefits-of-working-overseas-as-a-contractor/. 
 111 See Walter Pincus, U.S. Pays Steep Price for Private Security in Iraq, 
WASH. POST Oct. 1, 2007, at A17. 
 112 See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA & KENNON H. NAKAMURA, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, 
LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 4 (2008); See also Farley, supra note 111. 
(“It is not uncommon to find opportunities paying well over $100,000 in base pay 
alone.”). 
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provisions of the LHWCA.113 The DBA expressly provides that the 
liability of any covered employer or contractor “under this chapter 
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such em-
ployer . . . to his employees (and their dependents) . . . under the 
workmen’s compensation laws of any State, Territory, or other ju-
risdiction . . . .”114 Cases construing the DBA have given this provi-
sion its clear and obvious meaning and rejected arguments that the 
injured employee or his survivors can opt out of the Act in favor of 
more generous state workers compensation schemes.115 
Significantly more extensive immunity is provided by the 
DBA’s express adoption of “the provisions of the [LHWCA] . . . in 
respect to the injury or death of any employee engaged in any em-
ployment . . .”116 as defined by the Act.117 In this regard, the 
LHWCA provides that: 
[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in section 
904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all 
other liability of such employer to the employee, his 
legal representative, husband or wife, parents, de-
pendents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled 
to recover damages from such employer at law or in 
admiralty on account of such injury or death . . . .118 
This broad immunity provided under the LHWCA, which has 
been construed to “destroy any tort liability of the employer,”119 has 
similarly been interpreted in cases under the DBA as pre-empting 
 
 113 See Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 114 42 U.S.C. § 1651(c) (emphasis added). 
 115 See, e.g., Ross v. DynCorp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 344, 352–53, 365 (D.D.C. 
2005); Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (9th Cir. 1966)(holding 
that the language of § 1651(c) ‘‘clearly reveals a Congressional preference for the 
federal remedy[,]’’ and that allowing for election of remedies ‘‘would only inter-
fere with the apparent policy of the Defense Base Act by affording a choice of 
remedies which was not intended.’’). 
 116 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
 117 See Pope v. Palmer, No. 10-13285, 2011 WL 4502859, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 28, 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). 
 118 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (emphasis added). This section goes on to limit such 
immunity to employers which fail to secure compensation for the benefits set forth 
in the Act. Id. 
 119 Robin v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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all common law causes of action against the employer based upon 
negligence, regardless of how they are framed.120 This includes 
claims based upon negligent supervision, negligence per se or the 
performance of an ultrahazardous activity as well as causes of action 
under both wrongful death and survivorship statutes.121 
In Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, however, 
which arose out of the brutal torture and killing of four Blackwater 
security personnel by a mob in Fallujah early in the Iraq War, the 
district court concluded that the DBA did not “completely” preempt 
all state law claims.122 As a result, it remanded the plaintiffs’ state 
law claims for wrongful death and fraud back to the state court 
where they had been originally filed for further handling.123 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ victory was short lived as Blackwa-
ter subsequently successfully removed the case under the Federal 
Arbitration Act; thereafter, obtaining an order compelling arbitra-
tion pursuant to the terms of the contractors’ employment 
 
 120 See, e.g., Ross v. DynCorp., 362 F. Supp. 2d Supp. 344, 352 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(“[the LHWCA] necessarily displaces all derivative common-law causes of action 
based on the injury or death of a covered employee caused by employer negli-
gence, including wrongful death and survivorship actions.”); Flying Tiger v. 
Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (9th Cir. 1966) (“[42 U.S.C § 1651(c)] clearly reveals 
Congressional preference for the federal remedy”); Sparks v. Wyeth Lab’ys, Inc., 
431 F. Supp. 411, 417 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (‘‘The Defense Bases Act . . . makes 
the exclusive remedy of an employee of a covered government contractor against 
that contractor a compensation remedy under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act . . . .”). 
 121 See Ross, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52, 357–58; Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 
F.3d 1120, 1123, 1126–27 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Jones v. Halliburton Co., 791 F. 
Supp. 2d 567, 579, 602 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (and cases cited therein). 
 122 Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805, 
809 (E.D.N.C. 2005). 
 123 Id. at 803, 813–14. The plaintiffs’ complaint, which had been filed in state 
court and then removed to federal court, had been carefully drafted in a manner 
to avoid reference to federal law, so on its face it did not show the existence of a 
federal question. See id. at 803, 806–07. Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, 
the district court therefore concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdic-
tion, unless the claims were “completely” preempted by federal law. Id. at 806. 
Determining that such complete preemption did not exist, it remanded the case 
back to state court. See id. at 809, 814. In In re Blackwater Security Consulting, 
LLC., 460 F.3d 580, 580, 582 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit subsequently 
dismissed the appeal filed by Blackwater on the basis of 28 U.S.C. §1447(d)’s 
prohibition against the review of remand orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 
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agreement.124 The arbitration was subsequently dismissed for the 
nonpayment of arbitration costs, resulting in an award in Blackwa-
ter’s favor.125 
A recognized exception to the DBA’s exclusive application ex-
ists, however, for those claims which fall outside of the penumbra 
of the LHWCA.126 Courts have generally applied this exception 
where either (1) the claimed injuries did not meet the statutory def-
inition of an injury or (2) the employee’s injuries did not arise out 
of his or her employment.127 
Although the DBA applies to claims for the “injury or death of 
any employee,”128 the Act itself does not define “injury.”129 As a 
result, the courts have looked to the LHWCA for such a defini-
tion.130 
The term “injury” means accidental injury or death 
arising out of and in the course of employment, and 
such occupational disease or infection as arises natu-
rally out of such employment or as naturally or una-
voidably results from such accidental injury, and in-
cludes an injury caused by the willful act of a third 
person directed against an employee because of his 
employment.131 
Accordingly, the LHWCA (and by extension the DBA) does not 
apply where the employer acted with the specific intent to injure the 
employee.132 This loophole is extremely narrow, however, because 
 
 124 Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011 
WL237840, at *1–2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011). 
 125 Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC., 2011 WL 237840, at *5, *8; see dis-
cussion supra Introduction. 
 126 See, e.g., Jones, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 587–88 (and cases cited therein). 
 127 Id. at 588 (holding where the plaintiff’s claim was determined to have not 
arisen out of her employment, it did not matter whether her injuries came within 
the statutory definition, because it was not necessary for the plaintiff’s claim to 
meet both exceptions). 
 128 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
 129 E.g., Martin v. Halliburton, 808 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). 
 130 See id. 
 131 33 U.S.C. § 902(2). 
 132 See, e.g., Martin, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 992. 
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to qualify, the employer must have had a specific intent to injure the 
employee as claims based upon reckless misconduct are not suffi-
cient.133 
Although several courts have concluded that claims based upon 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress suffered by the em-
ployee are likewise barred in the absence of a specific intent to injure 
the worker,134 such claims have been permitted where the injury was 
suffered by the survivor of a deceased employee.135 Accordingly, in 
Martin v. Halliburton,136 the court upheld a daughter’s right to pur-
sue such a claim based upon the employer’s alleged fraudulent mis-
representation to her of the circumstances surrounding her father’s 
death, concluding “[p]laintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress flows from injury against her and not the ‘acci-
dental’ injury [her father] sustained.”137 
The second group of exceptions applies to claims that do not 
arise out of the plaintiff’s employment. For example, in Jones v. 
Halliburton Co., the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled 
to sue her employer for negligence, false imprisonment, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as a result of a rape by other 
co-employees.138 Even though her injuries did not arise out of her 
employment, the attack occurred at housing provided by the em-
ployer on the base where she worked in Iraq.139 
Similarly, in Brink v. Continental Insurance Company, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of various negligence 
claims brought in a class action, but held that individual plaintiffs 
 
 133 See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Vance v. CHF Int’l, 914 F. Supp. 2d 669, 678 n.1 (D. Md. 2012); Martin, 808 F. 
Supp. 2d at 992; Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D. 
Me. 1981) (holding that claims based upon reckless exposure to asbestos were 
pre-empted by the LHWCA). 
 134 See, e.g., Vance, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 682. 
 135 See Martin, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 993. 
 136 Id. at 993. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Jones v. Halliburton Co., 791 F. Supp. 2d 567, 584–88 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 139 Id. 
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could assert claims based upon both common law assault and sexual 
assault, since they would not arise under the LHWCA.140 
In a subsequent decision, Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enterprise 
Solutions, LLC., the D.C. Circuit addressed this exception in more 
detail.141 In this case, an employee (Elliott) of a military defense 
contractor providing base security services in Baghdad injured his 
back while lifting sandbags.142 He was treated by the base medic 
(Sickle), another employee of the same contractor, who subse-
quently recommended that he return home for more comprehensive 
medical diagnosis and treatment.143 Both Elliott and Sickle had 
signed employment contracts with their employer specifying a term 
of employment and procedures for terminating the contracts.144 
After returning stateside, Elliott filed a compensation claim un-
der the DBA, in response to which his employer denied the claim 
and terminated him, notwithstanding the terms of his contract.145 
Thereafter, Elliott received a copy of the medical report prepared by 
Sickle documenting his injuries from work, which he used to obtain 
benefits under the DBA.146 According to Sickle, the employer began 
to “‘threaten and intimidate’ him, insisting that he recant his support 
for Elliott’s workers’ compensation claim.”147 When he refused, he 
was likewise fired.148 
Elliott and Sickle subsequently jointly filed suit against their em-
ployer, asserting claims based upon retaliatory discharge, breach of 
contract, and conspiracy to commit tortious conduct with its insurer 
against them.149 After going through a lengthy preemption analysis, 
the circuit court concluded that Elliott’s claims all arose out of his 
employment, because they stemmed from his claim for benefits 
 
 140 Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The D.C. 
Circuit, however, upheld the district court’s dismissal of the claims based upon 
violation of RICO statutes. Id. at 1122. 
 141 Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., 884 F.3d 338, 348–50 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). 
 142 Id. at 342. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 342–43. 
 146 Id. at 343. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id.  
 149 Id.  
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under the DBA.150 As a result, it held that Elliott’s tort claims were 
barred.151 Conversely, it held that Sickle’s claims were not barred, 
since they did not arise out of his employment, but instead from El-
liott’s claim for benefits.152 
In an even more recent case involving highly unusual claims, the 
district court in U.S. ex rel. Fadlalla v. DynCorp International, 
LLC., held that neither Brink nor Sickle barred civil claims brought 
by a group of translators hired to assist U.S. military forces in the 
Middle East by a contractor, who was alleged to have engaged in a 
fraudulent scheme to employ them in violation of Kuwaiti criminal 
law.153 When the contractor subsequently attempted to fire its Ku-
waiti partner, the local company blew the whistle on the scheme to 
the authorities, who imprisoned the unwitting plaintiffs in inhumane 
conditions.154 The court distinguished Brink on the grounds that the 
RICO conspiracy claims therein were based upon an attempt to 
evade liability under the DBA, while the claims before it were based 
upon a scheme to circumvent Kuwaiti law.155  
The DBA only applies to claims asserted by an employee against 
the contractor which hired it.156 Therefore, lawsuits by service mem-
bers against contractors,157 or by the employee of one contractor 
against another, are not affected by the Act.158 
 
 150 Id. at 348. 
 151 Id. at 350. 
 152 Id. at 349–50. 
 153 See United States ex rel. Fadlalla v. DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 402 F. Supp. 3d 
162, 186 (D. Md. 2019). 
 154 Id. at 174–75. 
 155 See id. at 174, 200. 
 156 See Brink v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 157 See, e.g., Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 
WL 3940556, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (analyzing a case in which a soldier 
brought a negligence claim against private contractor rather than under the DBA). 
 158 See, e.g., Potts v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1246–48 
(M.D. Ala. 2006) (analyzing a case in which an employee of one contractor sued 
another contractor under several theories, including negligence, but not under the 
DBA). 
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II. CIVIL SUITS 
A. Political Question Doctrine 
Much of the litigation stemming from the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars has focused on the applicability of the political question doc-
trine, which arises from the separation of powers between the three 
branches of government established by the U. S. Constitution.159 
Under this doctrine, courts will refrain from deciding controversies, 
which “revolve around policy choices and value determinations con-
stitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the 
confines of the Executive Branch.”160 Or more simply stated, where 
the “responsibility for resolving [a particular claim] belongs to the 
legislative or executive branches rather than to the judiciary.”161 
Because the Constitution delegates authority over military af-
fairs to Congress and the President as Commander in Chief, while 
expressing no role for the judiciary, cases involving foreign policy 
and military determinations are particularly susceptible to such 
claims.162 As a result, the prevailing attitude of the courts has been 
that “[m]ost military decisions lie solely within the purview of the 
executive branch.”163 
Nevertheless, in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held that de-
termination of whether a case is nonjusticiable by virtue of present-
ing a political question cannot be resolved by simply a “semantical 
cataloguing” of the nature of the controversy, but instead requires a 
“discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of [each] 
particular case . . . .”164 
 
 159 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); see also Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court.”). 
 160 Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 
U.S. 221, 230 (1986)). 
 161 In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 162 See, e.g., Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111–12 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(dismissing claims brought by Palestinian residents of the West Bank against Is-
rael). 
 163 In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 334 (quoting Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root 
Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 407 n.9 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 164 369 U.S. at 217. 
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Accordingly, courts hearing cases involving the activities of mil-
itary contractors have recognized that “[t]he Constitution’s alloca-
tion of war powers to the President and Congress does not exclude 
the courts from every dispute that can arguably be connected to 
‘combat’” just as “it is error to suppose that every case or contro-
versy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cogni-
zance.”165 
As a result, “[c]ontroversies stemming from war are not auto-
matically deemed political questions merely because militaristic ac-
tivities are within the province of the Executive.”166 Accordingly, 
“the claim of military necessity will not, without more, shield gov-
ernment operations from judicial review,” even when part of an au-
thorized military operation.167 
To assist courts in performing the discriminating inquiry called 
for in Baker, the Supreme Court has set forth six indicia of a political 
question: 
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment; or 
(2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; or 
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or 
(4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government; or 
 
 165 Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal 
citations omitted). See also In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 334 (“[A]lthough cases involv-
ing military decision making often fall in the political question box, we cannot 
categorize such a case as nonjusticiable without delving into the circumstances at 
issue.”). 
 166 McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1320 (M.D. 
Fla. 2006) aff’d, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 167 Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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(5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or 
(6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifar-
ious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.168 
The Court in Baker went on to hold that “[u]nless one of these for-
mulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no 
dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political ques-
tion’s presence.”169 
As explained by the Third Circuit in Harris v. Kellogg Brown & 
Root Services, Inc., the application of the political question doctrine 
is often more complex in litigation against military contractors than 
in suits against the government itself.170 
Defense contractors do not have independent consti-
tutional authority and are not coordinate branches of 
government to which we owe deference. Conse-
quently, complaints against them for conduct that oc-
curs while they are providing services to the military 
in a theater of war rarely, if ever, directly implicate a 
political question. Nonetheless, these suits may pre-
sent nonjusticiable issues because military decisions 
that are textually committed to the executive some-
times lie just beneath the surface of the case. For ex-
ample, a contractor’s apparently wrongful conduct 
may be a direct result of an order from the military, 
or a plaintiff’s contributory negligence may be di-
rectly tied to the wisdom of an earlier military deci-
sion.171 
In considering the applicability of the doctrine to cases against 
military contractors, courts tend to focus on the first, second, and 
 
 168 McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1357–58 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962)); see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (“[t]hese tests are prob-
ably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.”).  
 169 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added). 
 170 Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 465 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 171 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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fourth Baker factors.172 Due to the inherent ambiguity of these fac-
tors, the application of the political question doctrine has been very 
uneven, and at times extremely inconsistent, prompting one circuit 
court to observe that “[n]o branch of the law of justiciability is in 
such disarray as the doctrine of ‘political question.’”173 Accord-
ingly, it is not surprising that courts have often applied it in seem-
ingly contradictory fashion in contractor cases. 
For example, in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., which 
involved the death of three servicemen in the crash of a small plane 
operated by a subsidiary of Blackwater in Afghanistan, the district 
court observed that the political question doctrine has been “applied 
in very limited circumstances, but it has almost never been applied 
to suits involving private defendants.”174 Conversely, other courts 
hearing suits against private contractors have concluded: “[g]iven 
the unprecedented levels at which today’s military relies on contrac-
tors to support its mission, [] this Court has recognized that a mili-
tary contractor acting under military orders can also invoke the po-
litical question doctrine as a shield under certain circumstances.”175 
Even in cases against the government, the application of the po-
litical question doctrine has at times been inconsistent. In Koohi v. 
United States, the Ninth Circuit rejected its application to a lawsuit 
arising out of the erroneous downing of a civilian Iranian aircraft by 
a U.S. battleship, which had mistaken it for a F-14 fighter jet during 
a period of heightened hostilities adjunct to the Iran-Iraq War.176 Yet 
in Aktepe v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit applied the political 
question doctrine to bar a suit by members of the Turkish Navy, 
whose ship was accidentally hit by live Sparrow missiles fired by 
the U.S.S. Saratoga during NATO simulated war games.177 
 
 172 See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 893 F.3d 241, 259 (4th Cir. 2018); see 
also Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 408–09 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
 173 Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 
F.2d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS § 14, at 74 (4th ed. 1983)). 
 174 McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1318–19 
(M.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 175 In re KBR, 893 F.3d at 259. 
 176 Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1330–32 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 177 Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1401, 1401–03 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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Much of the difficulty in applying the doctrine arises from the 
lack of definitive parameters and guidance afforded by the Baker 
factors, particularly in the military context.178 As a result, some 
courts have taken an expansive view, concluding that “[m]atters in-
timately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely 
proper subjects for judicial intervention.”179 Other courts, however, 
have expressed the more restrictive posture that just because an ac-
tion is “taken in the ordinary exercise of discretion in the conduct of 
war” does not by itself remove the action from judicial review. 180 
The wide discretion afforded by the Baker factors has, thus, al-
lowed courts to utilize varying philosophical approaches in analyz-
ing the applicability of the doctrine in specific cases.181 For exam-
ple, in McMahon, the district court adopted a very restrictive view 
of its parameters in this context by noting that “[m]ilitary-related 
cases that constitute political questions have been limited to ‘direct 
challenges to the institutional functioning of the military in such ar-
eas as the relationship between personnel, discipline, and train-
ing . . . [or challenges] impact[ing] upon the internal functioning and 
operation of the military.”182 
This rationale was largely followed by the Eleventh Circuit in 
affirming the district court’s opinion.183 After noting that decisions 
such as “whether and under what circumstances to employ military 
force” and “[t]he strategy and tactics employed on the battlefield” 
are typically political questions, the court concluded that claims 
against contractors are “at least one step removed” from such cases 
filed against the government.184Accordingly, the contractor will 
“carry a double burden,” first being required to establish that “the 
claims against it will require reexamination of a decision by the 
 
 178 WRIGHT, supra note 173, at 80. 
 179 Aktepe, 105 F.3d at 1403 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)). 
 180 Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1332 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 715 
(1900)). 
 181 WRIGHT, supra note 173, at 77. 
 182 McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 (quot-
ing Nation Mag. v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 762 F. Supp 1558, 1567 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)), aff’d, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 183 See McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1366. 
 184 Id. at 1359. 
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military” and then “it must demonstrate that the military decision at 
issue . . . is insulated from judicial review.”185 
Courts adopting this more restrictive view of the political ques-
tion doctrine have limited its application to the types of cases that 
require the court to “second-guess military strategic, tactical, or pol-
icy decisions.”186 These courts have also been reluctant to apply the 
doctrine to the types of cases involving more traditional tort liability, 
even if they relate to the military actions occurring inside a war 
zone.187 
As pointed out by one court in a suit brought by a soldier injured 
by a manufacturing defect in an artillery gun, “[w]hether the manu-
facturing process was faulty is not a political question; it is a routine 
issue of civil, and civilian, tort law.”188 As further expressed by an-
other court in a similar artillery defect case, 
Plaintiffs claim that [defendant] failed to manufac-
ture the mortar cartridge in the way the government 
directed. In considering whether the mortar cartridge 
was defectively manufactured, this court need not ex-
amine the wisdom of the government’s design of the 
mortar shell or its decision to use a contractor. [The 
defendant’s] liability turns on whether the mortar 
cartridge was or was not defectively manufactured, a 
matter unrelated to the appropriateness [of] any 
Army policy or “the wisdom of military operations 
 
 185 Id. at 1359–60.  
 186 Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (case brought by contractor’s employee, who fell in a latrine lo-
cated within a forward operating base in Iraq due to its claimed negligent con-
struction was not barred). 
 187 Id. (“When faced with an ‘ordinary tort suit,’ the textual commitment fac-
tor actually weighs in favor of resolution by the judiciary.’”); see also McMahon, 
460 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (“Tort suits are within the province of the judiciary, and 
that conclusion is not automatically negated simply because the claim arises in a 
military context, or because it bears tangentially on the powers of the executive 
and legislative branches.”) (and cases cited therein). 
 188 McMahon v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695 (D.N.J. 
2013). 
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and decision-making.” Instead, this court will merely 
examine the manufacturer’s performance. 189 
On the other hand, the more expansive view is illustrated by the 
following statement from Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,190 
the objectives of tort law—deterrence, punishment, 
and providing a remedy to innocent victims—are in-
consistent with the government’s interests in combat, 
and thus tort law cannot be applied to government 
actions in combat. Similarly, the application of tort 
law to contractors for suits arising from combat 
would frustrate government combat interests.191 
Typically, in those cases in which the district courts have applied 
the doctrine to bar suits against private defendants, the government 
has exercised significant control over either the conduct at issue or 
the private defendant.192 Therefore, in applying the Baker factors, 
cases often turn on the question of who was controlling the activity 
in question at the time of the injury or death and the nature of such 
control.193 
As pointed out in a number of circuit court opinions, the issue of 
control is generally one of fact and accordingly, where the military 
“merely provides the contractor with general guidelines that can be 
satisfied at the contractor’s discretion,” sufficient control is often 
found to be lacking.194 For example, in Potts v. Dyncorp Interna-
tional, LLC., an employee of one contractor was seriously injured 
while riding in a truck operated by an employee of another contrac-
tor being used to transport nonmilitary food supplies under contract 
 
 189 Rodriguez v. Gen. Dynamics Armament and Tech. Prods., Inc., 696 F. 
Supp. 2d 1163, 1185 (D. Haw. 2010) (internal citations omitted). See also 
McMahon, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1321. 
 190 Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1493 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
 191 Id. 
 192 See, e.g., Potts v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1251 (M.D. 
Ala. 2006) (noting that the government did not control the private contractor). 
 193 See id. at 1250–51 (reasoning that because defendant’s own policies con-
trolled its conduct, the court would not need to assess U.S. military procedures, 
thus, there were no separation of powers concerns). 
 194 In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
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with the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”).195 While racing 
at speeds over ninety-nine miles per hour on the highways between 
Trebil, Jordan and Baghdad, Iraq, the truck swerved to avoid an un-
known black object, later identified as a dog, causing it to flip over 
several times and explode into flames.196 
In support of the contention that the case involved the adjudica-
tion of a political question, the contractor argued that the determina-
tion of the plaintiff’s claims would require the court to evaluate the 
propriety of the security procedures contained in Dyncorp’s contract 
with the CPA, thereby meeting the first Baker factor.197 The con-
tractor also argued that the second Baker factor was met because the 
case revolved around the question of what a reasonable driver would 
do when faced with the possibility of hostile fire in a war zone, for 
which there were no “judicially discoverable or manageable stand-
ards.”198 
In rejecting the first contention, the court noted that Dyncorp’s 
contract called for it to be responsible for the day-to-day execution 
of its security services, the professional and technical competence 
of its employees, and oversight for all its operations.199 The court 
went on to further observe that Dyncorp’s contract “was a civilian 
contract to provide non-military security services to non-military 
personnel for the purpose of delivering non-military supplies.”200 
Accordingly, it concluded that the key inquiry was not the wisdom 
of military operations, but merely the sufficiency of Dyncorp’s in-
ternal policies and whether it had complied with them under the 
terms of its contract.201 
The court likewise rejected the applicability of the second Baker 
factor on the grounds that because “Dyncorp was not acting ‘subject 
to military regulations and orders,’” the court could utilize normal 
tort principles (i.e. whether the driver acted reasonably under the 
 
 195 465 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1247–48 (M.D. Ala. 2006). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 1248. 
 198 Id. at 1252. 
 199 Id. at 1250. 
 200 Id. at 1250–51. 
 201 Id at 1253–54. 
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circumstances) to determine whether liability existed for the plain-
tiff’s injuries.202 
A similar ruling was reached in Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 
which involved a serious injury to a soldier who was providing a 
military escort to a supply truck convoy.203 When one of the trucks 
in the convoy broke down, the escort was required to stop on the 
side of the road in a military zone.204 While the other soldiers se-
cured the area from potential insurgent attack, the plaintiff assisted 
the driver in fixing the truck.205 During the repairs, the plaintiff was 
struck in the head by the truck’s ramp assist arm and sustained seri-
ous brain injuries.206 
Although accepting the contractor’s argument that the political 
question doctrine could be raised by private entities,207 the court re-
jected its application in the case before it. The court concluded that 
it did not involve an analysis of military decision-making or the way 
government operations were conducted.208 Instead, the court noted 
that the case was “essentially, a traffic accident, involving a com-
mercial truck alleged to have been negligently maintained, as well 
as a civilian truck driver who was allegedly negligent in operating 
the truck and insufficiently trained.”209 
In Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., however, 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of another convoy case 
in which the driver of a tanker rolled over while negotiating a curve 
in the road, resulting in severe brain damage to the soldier serving 
 
 202 Id at 1253. 
 203 Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL 
3940556, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See id. at *3 n.1 (quoting United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 
(1990))(“[T]he identity of the litigant is immaterial to the presence of [political 
question] concerns in a particular case.”). 
 208 Id. at 3. (“While the actions taken by Lessin, a military officer, in assisting 
the truck will likely be relevant to causation, it is by no means clear that the poli-
cies or decisions of the military or of the executive branch itself will be implicated 
in this case. It does not follow, therefore, that the case will require initial policy 
decisions committed to the discretion of the political branches, or that adjudica-
tion of the case will evince a lack of respect for the political branches.”). 
 209 Id. 
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as a guard.210 The court reasoned that since the military picked the 
time and route of the convoy, set the speed and distance to be main-
tained between the vehicles, established the security measures to be 
taken, and that the “circumstances under which the accident took 
place were so thoroughly pervaded by military judgments and deci-
sions,” it would not be possible to determine whether the contractor 
had been negligent without judicial scrutiny of these military judg-
ments.211 
Such conflicting results also occur outside of the convoy context 
as seen in several cases arising out of attacks on military bases by 
suicide bombers. In Smith v. Halliburton Company, the family of a 
civilian contractor, who was killed in a suicide bomb attack on a 
mess hall in Mosul, Iraq, sued Halliburton, the parent company of 
the contractor which operated the dining facility.212 The suit claimed 
that its subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, failed to exercise proper 
security, thereby allowing the suicide bomber, who was dressed in 
an Iraqi military uniform, to walk in and detonate his bomb.213 
The court focused on the contract between the contractor and the 
government, which did not place responsibility upon the contractor 
to provide security for the base, and found that “[i]n the absence of 
any contractual directive to provide security, the Army assigns re-
sponsibility for force protection, including security, to the military, 
not to civilian contractors . . . . Although contractors may be armed, 
they may only be armed for the purpose of individual self-de-
fense.”214 
As a result, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the 
case was a simple premises liability suit, but instead raised a politi-
cal question, since it would require the court 
to second-guess the decisions of the United States 
military, even though the suit is ostensibly against 
only military contractors . . . [since] [b]y alleging 
that defendants were negligent in providing security 
 
 210 Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 572 F.3d 1271, 1277–78, 
1296 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 211 Id. at 1281–83. 
 212 Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 30, 2006). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at *3. 
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[at the facility] . . . plaintiffs are, in effect alleging 
that the military was negligent in providing secu-
rity . . . .215 
In Hencely v. Fluor Corp., Inc., another district court judge held 
that a political question was not presented in a suicide bombing oc-
curring on a base operated by a private contractor.216 In this case, 
the perpetrator, who had been a former member of the Taliban, was 
an employee of a sub-contractor of the defendant.217 Although the 
bomber had been vetted and placed at the base by the government, 
the complaint focused solely upon the claims of the contractor’s sub-
sequent negligent supervision and retention of him.218 The court re-
jected the defendant’s attempts to point the finger at the government 
for its role in approving the bomber for employment at the base as 
part of its defense.219 
A different district judge, however, reached the opposite conclu-
sion in another case arising out of the very same incident in Loquasto 
v. Fluor Corp., Inc.220 Here, the court refused to follow the reason-
ing utilized in Hencely just seven months earlier.221 
In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., the Fourth Circuit, 
which has been the forum for many of these lawsuits as the home to 
several military contractors, sought to simplify and clarify the polit-
ical question analysis by distilling Baker’s six factors into two ques-
tions: 
[F]irst . . . “whether the government contractor was 
under the ‘plenary’ or ‘direct’ control of the military” 
(direct control). Second, . . . whether “national de-
fense interests were ‘closely intertwined’ with mili-
tary decisions governing the contractor’s conduct, 
such that a decision on the merits of the claim ‘would 
 
 215 Id. at *5. 
 216 Hencely v. Fluor Corp., Inc., No. 6:19-cv-00489-BHH, 2020 WL 2838687, 
at *1 (D.S.C. June 1, 2020). 
 217 Id. at *8, *9. 
 218 Id. at *8–12. 
 219 Id. at *11–12. 
 220 See Loquasto v. Fluor Corp., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 3d 728, 741 (N.D. Tex. 
2021). 
 221 Id. 
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require the judiciary to question actual, sensitive 
judgments made by the military.’” An affirmative re-
sponse to either of the two . . . factors . . . generally 
triggers application of the political question doc-
trine.222 
Nevertheless, even this simple two factor test has proved diffi-
cult to consistently administer as witnessed by the seemingly con-
flicting conclusions reached in Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Ser-
vices, Inc.223 and the two KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litigation opinions.224 
In Taylor, a Marine suffered severe injuries when he was electro-
cuted while installing a back-up generator in a military base in Iraq 
after an employee of the contractor turned on the main generator, 
despite the Marine Corps’ instructions not to do so.225 Although 
concluding that the contractor was not under the control of the mil-
itary, the court reasoned that assessing the contractor’s contributory 
negligence defense would require it to evaluate military decisions 
made by the Marine leadership, such as whether a back-up generator 
should have been installed, thereby requiring dismissal of the suit.226 
In the first of the court’s subsequent In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit 
Litigation opinions, it utilized a much narrower analysis to reject a 
similar argument made by the contractor.227 In this case, servicemen 
and civilian employees sued KBR claiming injuries because of ex-
posure to toxic chemicals caused by the burning of various wastes 
prohibited by Department of Defense regulations and by improper 
water purification procedures.228 The court rejected the argument 
that a political question was involved simply because the military 
had decided to use burn pits, which it considered an “acceptable” 
 
 222 Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech, Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 155 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 
658 F.3d 402, 411 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 223 See Taylor v. Kelogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 403 (4th 
Cir. 2011). 
 224 See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331–32 (4th Cir. 2014); 
see also In re KBR, Inc., 893 F.3d 241, 253 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 225 Taylor, 658 F.3d at 404. 
 226 Id. at 411–12. 
 227 In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d at 335. 
 228 Id. at 332. 
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but last option for disposing of waste.229 Although recognizing that 
the contractor had produced “some evidence demonstrat[ing] that 
the military exercised control over [its] burn pit activities,” conflict-
ing evidence established that the contractor controlled the manner 
of the work.230 
The court went on to adopt the analysis utilized by the Third 
Circuit in Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., which in-
volved a wrongful death action brought by the family of a soldier, 
who was electrocuted while taking a shower in his barracks.231 The 
family alleged that the contractor, who was charged with mainte-
nance of the facility, failed to properly ground a water pump result-
ing in the electrocution of their son.232 The court focused on the el-
ement of control over the manner that the particular work in question 
was to be performed: 
where the military does not exercise control but 
merely provides the contractor with general guide-
lines that can be satisfied at the contractor’s discre-
tion, contractor actions taken within that discretion 
do not necessarily implicate unreviewable military 
decisions.233 
In reliance upon Harris, the Fourth Circuit similarly concluded 
that where the evidence establishes that the military merely provides 
the “goals to achieve[,] but not how to achieve them[,]” a political 
question is not involved.234 
When the case came back to the court four years later, however, 
the Fourth Circuit concluded that additional discovery taken in the 
interim established that the military’s control over the waste dis-
posal procedures was “plenary and actual,” requiring dismissal of 
the case as presenting a political question.235 
 
 229 Id. at 336–39. 
 230 Id. at 337. 
 231 Id. at 338–39; Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,724 F.3d 462, 
462–63 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 232 Harris, 724 F.3d at 463. 
 233 Id. at 467. 
 234 In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit, 744 F.3d at 339. 
 235 In re KBR, Inc., 893 F.3d at 241, 261 (4th Cir. 2018). 
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Another issue which has created inconsistencies in the applica-
tion of the political question doctrine is the willingness of some 
courts to look beyond the claims raised by the plaintiff’s complaint 
and to analyze the issues that may be implicated by the contractor’s 
potential defenses.236 
For example, in Amedi v. BAE Systems, Inc., after a contractor 
was killed when a mine resistant ambush protected (“MRAP”) ve-
hicle broke apart  upon striking an improvised explosive device 
(“IED”), his family sued the manufacturer claiming that it failed to 
meet the government’s specifications during construction.237 Alt-
hough acknowledging that the plaintiff’s claims of manufacturing 
defects would likely not raise political questions, the court neverthe-
less held that the defendant’s likely defenses, which pointed the fin-
ger at the military for negligence in the convoy formation, the route 
selected, and the sufficiency of safeguards to avoid IEDs, would 
raise such issues—requiring a dismissal of the case.238 
Other courts, however, have refused to allow the defendant to 
define the political question analysis in such a manner. A good ex-
ample is McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp., which involved an-
other battlefield products liability claim, this time by a soldier who 
was seriously injured when a machine gun misfired.239 Although the 
plaintiff only challenged the contractor’s manufacture of the 
weapon, the defendant “state[ed] that it [would] defend itself in a 
manner that [would] drag the Court into exacting evaluations of the 
Army’s policies and the actions of its soldiers.”240 
The court rejected the product manufacturer’s argument, observ-
ing that it  
 
 236 See Amedi v. BAE Systems, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 
2011). 
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F.3d 1271, 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (dismissing case which arose out of al-
leged negligent operation of a vehicle in a military convoy, because of the con-
tractor’s defense that military decisions caused the accident). 
 238 Amendi, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1357–58. 
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is too broad; it would give the defendants too much 
power to define the issues. Indeed, it would bar vir-
tually any claim in which the contractor posited that 
the military, not itself, was at fault. In the great ma-
jority of cases dismissing claims on political question 
grounds, the allegedly faulty exercise of military 
judgment was the basis of the complaint, not of a hy-
pothetical defense. McMahon does not challenge any 
order he was given, or indeed anything that occurred 
in Afghanistan. His allegation of a manufacturing de-
fect could stand alone without implicating any deci-
sion committed to the discretion of the military.241 
The difficulties which the political question analysis have 
caused the courts is demonstrated by the legal journey of four neg-
ligent convoy cases originally decided by the same district court 
judge: Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc.,242 Smith-Idol v. Halliburton,243 
Lane v. Halliburton,244 and Woodson v. Halliburton.245 The judge 
originally dismissed each of the cases on the grounds that they pre-
sented political questions, concluding that under the defendant’s 
contract with the government, and regulations issued by the Army 
to define the respective roles of the military forces and the contrac-
tor, that “the Army was, at the very least, significantly involved in 
transportation and force protection decisions.”246 
Following the dismissals, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded the cases247 back to the district court to deter-
mine whether they could be resolved “without needing to make a 
constitutionally impermissible review of war time decision 
 
 241 Id. 
 242 Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 243 Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2006 WL 2927685, at *1, *2 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2006). 
 244 Lane v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1971, 2006 WL 2796249, at *1, *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Sept. 26, 2006). 
 245 Woodson v. Halliburton, No. H-06-2107, 2006 WL 2796228, at *1, *2 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006). 
 246 See Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 643. 
 247 Three of the four dismissals were appealed: See e.g., Lane, 2006 WL 
2796249, at *1; Smith-Idol, 2006 WL 2927685, at *1; and Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 
2d at 645. 
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making.”248 After allowing the parties extensive discovery and uti-
lizing the analytical standards established by the Fifth Circuit, the 
district judge concluded the second time around that the cases did 
not in fact involve political questions, since their focus was not on 
the military’s gathering of information, but instead on Halliburton’s 
use of it after it was communicated.249 
While therefore denying the motion to dismiss based upon the 
political question doctrine, the district judge nevertheless granted 
the contractor’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs’ actions were barred by the exclusive remedy provi-
sions of the Defense Base Act.250 When the cases reached the Fifth 
Circuit for the second time,251 the court upheld the summary judg-
ments under the DBA, but decided that it did not need to revisit the 
political question issue.252 
The ultimate takeaway from these cases is that the complex and 
interdependent nature of the contractor-military relationship, which 
characterized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, makes it necessary 
to focus on the specific allegations of negligence in each case. 
Where the case challenges actions by the contractor which have the 
potential to implicate military decisions or actions, it is more likely 
that a political question will be found.253 Where, however, the case 
is directed to the contractor’s failure to comply with government 
regulations as adopted, its misuse of information provided by the 
military or its own failure to exercise reasonable care, the case is 
more likely to be subject to normal civil tort principles.254 
A good example of the application of such analysis is seen in 
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., where both the government 
 
 248 Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 249 See Fisher v. Halliburton, 696 F. Supp. 2d 710, 722–23 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 250 See Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2010 WL 2196268, at *1 
(S.D. Tex. May 27, 2010). 
 251 See Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 603 (5th Cir. 2012). The Lane case 
was settled prior to the appeal, leaving only Fisher and Smith-Idol for the second 
appeal. 
 252 Fisher, 667 F.3d at 606. 
 253 Smith-Idol, 2006 WL 2927685, at *1–2. 
 254 Fisher, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 722–23. 
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and the contractor shared responsibilities for the flights in ques-
tion.255 The court first delineated each party’s obligations:256 
On the most general level, the SOW [statement of 
work]257 required Presidential to “[p]rovide all fixed-
wing aircraft, personnel, equipment, tools, material, 
maintenance, and supervision necessary . . . for the 
missions DoD requested . . . . The SOW further gave 
Presidential the ultimate responsibility for ensuring 
the safety of the flights it was operating . . . . [T]he 
military’s duties (according to the SOW) were rela-
tively discrete. The military chose the start and end 
points of the flights, and chose when the flights 
would be flown (qualified by Presidential’s power to 
decline a mission for safety reasons). The military 
also imposed certain constraints on Presidential’s ex-
ercise of its supervisory responsibilities. It limited 
the working hours of Presidential’s pilots; specified 
minimum requirements for the aircraft; set out mini-
mum and maximum amounts of passengers and 
cargo; and contained a provision requiring Presiden-
tial employees to comply with General Order One 
(which contained general rules of conduct for all ser-
vice members in Afghanistan).258 
 
 255 McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331,1361 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
 256 Id. at 1360–61. 
 257 Id. at 1360, 1336 (statements of work are issued by the military to define 
the contractor’s specific responsibilities under its umbrella contract with the gov-
ernment); Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 572 F.3d 1271, 1276 n. 
2 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting the umbrella contract between the contractor and the 
military is made under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (“LOGAP”), 
which “define[s] the general contours of the military’s relationship with civilian 
contractors.” The specific nature of the relationship is “further governed by a 
patchwork of other agreements and instruments,” including the Army Field Man-
ual, Department of Defense directives and “Statements of Work (SOW) and Task 
Orders (TO) by which the contract is implemented”); see also In re KBR, Inc., 
Burn Pit Litigation, 744 F.3d 326, 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 258 McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1360–61 (emphasis added). 
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The court then looked to the plaintiff’s specific claims of negli-
gence:259 
McMahon’s allegations [do not] relate to any of these 
discrete areas of military responsibility. She does not 
challenge the military’s scheduling of the flights; the 
force protection the military provided on the base; or 
the military’s generalized restrictions on Presidential 
employees while they were on the base pursuant to 
General Order One. Rather, her allegations relate 
principally to the operation of the flight, for which 
Presidential retained residual responsibility under the 
terms of the SOW. McMahon alleges “[n]egli-
gent . . . entrusting an aircraft to a flight crew inex-
perienced in flying the mountainous terrain of Af-
ghanistan”; “. . . failure to conduct a formal route 
study”; “. . . failure to properly plan and execute 
the . . . flight”; and other challenges to the opera-
tional details of the flight.260 
As a result, the court concluded that the prosecution of the case 
would not require a reexamination of any decision made by the mil-
itary thereby rendering the political question doctrine inapplica-
ble.261 
The type of analysis undertaken in McMahon recognizes the im-
portant underlying principle emphasized in Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. 
Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, that “the doctrine ‘is one of “polit-
ical questions,” not one of “political cases.’” The fact that the issues 
before us arise in a politically charged context does not convert what 
is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable political 
question.”262 
 
 259 Id. at 1361. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. at 1360, 1365. 
 262 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (inter-
nal citations omitted)(suit by family of passenger against the PLO arising from 
the hijacking of a cruise ship was not subject to dismissal as raising a political 
question). 
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B. Sovereign Immunity and the Feres Doctrine 
Some contractors have claimed a direct entitlement to sovereign 
immunity under the so-called Feres doctrine, which bars a soldier 
from recovery against the government under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (“FTCA”) for injuries which “arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service.”263 For example, in McMahon 
v. Presidential Airways, Inc., the contractor argued that “‘as military 
contractors operating in a combat zone,’ they should share in the 
Government’s sovereign immunity because ‘the reality of modern 
warfare’ is that contractors perform traditional military func-
tions . . . characterizing their role as part of the ‘Total Force.’”264 
The contractor based its argument on the contention that the 
plaintiffs’ status as servicemen was the critical element of the Feres 
doctrine and not the government’s role as the defendant.265 The dis-
trict court rejected this argument, holding that “Feres has never been 
applied to protect private parties from tort liability.”266 
The rejection of the Feres doctrine to a private contractor is 
clearly required by both the wording of the FTCA and the Feres 
opinion itself.267 The FTCA expressly excludes contractors from the 
scope of the Act.268 
As used in this chapter . . . the term “Federal agency” 
includes the executive departments, the judicial and 
legislative branches, the military departments, inde-
pendent establishments of the United States, and cor-
porations primarily acting as instrumentalities or 
agencies of the United States, but does not include 
any contractor with the United States.269 
 
 263 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (Feres was a serviceman 
who died in a barrack’s fire as an alleged result of the Army’s negligence in using 
an unsafe facility and in failing to maintain an adequate fire watch. Two other 
cases based upon claimed medical malpractice of Army surgeons were consoli-
dated with it in the Supreme Court). 
 264 McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1325 (M.D. 
Fla. 2006). 
 265 Id. at 1325–26. 
 266 Id. at 1328. 
 267 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141–42; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 
 268 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 
 269 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Such a contention is also inconsistent with the Court’s holding 
in Feres, which allows recovery against the government for “tort 
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances . . . .”270 In analyzing this issue, the 
Court looked to the role of the FTCA and the history of sovereign 
immunity in the United States, concluding that the Act did not create 
new remedies against the government, but merely waived sovereign 
immunity for existing causes of action applicable to private parties 
under the same circumstances.271 Finding a lack of equivalent rem-
edies in the private sphere, the Court held, “[w]e know of no Amer-
ican law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negli-
gence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is 
serving.”272 
The indispensable role of the federal government as the defend-
ant to the application of the Feres doctrine was further emphasized 
by the Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Johnson.273 
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit previously held that the claims as-
serted by the families of Coast Guard rescuers, whose helicopter 
crashed during a mission, were not barred by Feres, since the 
claimed negligence was that of civilian FAA employees.274 The Su-
preme Court rejected this conclusion, explaining that the critical fac-
tor was the role of the federal government as the defendant, not the 
job description of the employees whose negligence gave rise to the 
claim.275 
As a result, those courts which have considered the attempted 
extension of the Feres doctrine to military contractors, have rejected 
the argument on the grounds that since sovereign immunity is only 
applicable to the government, the Feres exception to the statutory 
waiver of sovereign immunity can only apply to suits by servicemen 
against the government.276 
 
 270 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674). 
 271 Id. at 142. 
 272 Id. at 141 (emphasis added). 
 273 United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1987). 
 274 See Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 275 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 689–90. 
 276 See, e.g., Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 272 (9th 
Cir. 1990); Durant v. Neneman, 884 F.2d 1350, 1354 (10th Cir. 1989); McMahon 
v. v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 aff’d 502 F.3d 1331, 1352–
53; Ammend v. BioPort, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 848, 879 (W.D. Mich 2004); see 
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In reaching this conclusion, the courts have focused on the iden-
tity of the defendant, rather than the nature of the work being per-
formed.277 
The [Supreme] Court emphasized that “[t]he congru-
ence of professional interests between contractors 
and the Federal Government is not complete” be-
cause “the contractors remained distinct entities pur-
suing private ends, and their actions remained com-
mercial activities carried on for profit. 
This reasoning is helpful. Westinghouse’s private 
profit objectives in operating under the contract es-
tablish it as an entity distinct from the government.278 
Perhaps in recognition of the foregoing, on appeal the contractor 
in McMahon refined its argument to contend that “it was a common 
law agent of the federal government at the time of the accident, and 
is therefore entitled to the sovereign immunity the government 
might have under the Feres doctrine. [This] argument relies on the 
doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity.”279 
The doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity originated in the 
case of Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., which involved a claim by 
a landowner against a contractor building dikes in the Missouri 
River under contract with the federal government in exercising its 
eminent domain power. 280 The specific work was being performed 
under the direction of the Secretary of War and the supervision of 
the Chief of Engineers of the United States.281 The Court concluded 
that where the agent was acting within the express authority validly 
granted by the government “[t]he action of the agent is ‘the act of 
the government.’”282   
 
also Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 874–75 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(refusing to extend sovereign immunity to grenade manufacturer for a Vietnam 
training accident). 
 277 Chapman, 911 F.2d at 271. 
 278 Id. (citation omitted). 
 279 McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1341. 
 280 Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 19 (1940). 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 22. 
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As observed by the Sixth Circuit in Adkisson v. Jacobs Engi-
neering Group, Inc.,283 a non-military contractor case, “Yearsley’s 
spare reasoning, however, creates uncertainty as to the scope of the 
decision.”284 Nevertheless, several circuit court decisions have re-
lied upon the doctrine in different contexts to shield contractors from 
liability where they were performing actions for which the govern-
ment itself would be immune from suit.285 
The doctrine has not fared very well, however, when raised by 
military contractors in cases arising out of combat hostilities. In 
Bynum v. FMC Corporation,286 which involved a claim by a Na-
tional Guardsman for injuries due to the alleged negligent manufac-
ture of a military vehicle, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[t]he difficulty 
of establishing a traditional agency relationship with the government 
makes the derivative sovereign immunity defense ill-suited to many 
manufacturers of military equipment.”287 
 
 283 See Adkisson v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., 790 F.3d 641, 646–647 
(6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the doctrine can only be applicable where the contrac-
tor is performing acts for which the government would be immune. In this case 
the underlying legal question was whether the government would have been liable 
under the FTCA if it had been the negligent actor). 
 284 Id. The doctrine was revisited by the Court in several more recent cases, 
but without fully filling in its scope. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 
393–94 (U.S. 2012) (holding that an attorney hired by a city to assist it in con-
ducting an investigation into an employee’s potential wrongdoing was entitled to 
the same qualified immunity for his actions as city employees in performing the 
same activities); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 166, 168–69 (U.S. 
2016) (holding that an advertising company hired by the Navy to text recruiting 
messages to young adults was not entitled to immunity for failing to follow the 
terms of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 
 285 See, e.g., Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding 
a private contractor was entitled to derivative sovereign immunity under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunity Act for following the commands of a foreign sovereign 
in refusing to promote female employee); Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 
F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding dredging companies were entitled to immunity 
for environmental damages caused by their activities performed pursuant to con-
tracts with federal government); Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 
1963) (holding a contractor could not be held liable for trespass in constructing a 
highway in conformance with the terms of a contract with the federal government 
by landowners claiming that the construction exceeded government right-of-
way). 
 286 770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 287 Id. 
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Noting that it had previously “never upheld a claim of derivative 
sovereign immunity,” the Eleventh Circuit in McMahon concluded 
that “if it in fact exists,” which it declined to decide, it would require 
that the entity seeking immunity “must at a bare minimum have been 
a common law agent of the government.”288 Even where such a re-
lationship existed, however, the court warned that would not be 
enough by itself to invest a private entity with sovereign immun-
ity.289 
Since the contractor sought entitlement to sovereign immunity 
solely by virtue of its claimed status as a common law agent, the 
Eleventh Circuit rejected the application of the Feres doctrine to 
it.290 Nevertheless, after a detailed analysis of the policies underly-
ing the Feres doctrine, the court concluded that while it was not ap-
plicable, there still might be some limited form of immunity due to 
contractors in “their making or executing sensitive military judg-
ments.”291 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not find that the Feres 
“incident to service” standard provided the proper test for determin-
ing when such immunity was appropriate.292 Accordingly, the court 
went on to hold that even if such immunity could hypothetically ex-
ist that it would not be appropriate in this case.293 
The only other circuit courts to consider this question in the mil-
itary contractor context are the Fourth and Ninth circuits.294 In 
Chapman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,295 which involved a per-
sonal injury claim by a Navy enlisted man who was injured as a 
result of the collapse of a deck at a government owned reactor, the 
Ninth Circuit likewise rejected the application of the defense, focus-
ing on the difference between the government’s objectives and the 
contractors profit motive.296 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
 
 288 502 F.3d at 1343. 
 289 Id. at 1344. 
 290 Id. at 1346. 
 291 Id. at 1350–51. 
 292 Id. at 1351. 
 293 Id. at 1355–56. 
 294 See generally Chapman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 911 F.2d 267 (9th 
Cir. 1990); In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit Litig., 925 F. Supp. 2d 752 (D. Md. 2013). 
 295 911 F.2d 267, 268 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 296 Id. at 271 (quoting U.S. v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 738–40 (1982)) 
(holding that private companies operating atomic research facilities under contract 
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the contractor could not be considered a government employee, 
thereby precluding the application of sovereign immunity.297 
In In re KBR, Inc. Burn Pit Litigation, however, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the defense could be applicable in the contractor set-
ting but concluded that the district court had improperly applied it 
to dismiss the claims of both soldiers and employees seeking to re-
cover for injuries claimed to have occurred from exposure to toxic 
chemicals caused by burning waste in huge pits.298 The court held 
that for the defense to be applicable, it was not enough for the gov-
ernment to merely set the general scope or parameters of a pro-
ject.299 Instead, it must establish specific instructions, which the 
contractor was strictly following at the time.300 Accordingly, where 
the contractor has discretion in performing its activities, derivative 
sovereign immunity cannot apply.301 
C. Government Contractor Defense and Combat Activities 
Exception 
As a result of the refusal of most courts to allow the direct ap-
plication of sovereign immunity to non-governmental entities, mili-
tary contractors have subsequently raised several new defenses 
seeking to obtain their own analogous version of immunity by rely-
ing upon exclusions applicable to the government under the FTCA. 
The first successful foray into this area gave rise to the “government 
contractor defense.”302 This defense, in turn, led to the recognition 
by some courts of what is now commonly called the “combat 
 
with the Department of Energy were not government employees entitled to im-
munity from state taxation). 
 297 Id. 
 298 744 F.3d 331, 331 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’g, 925 F. Supp. 2d 752, 753 (D. Md. 
2013). 
 299 Id. at 345–46. 
 300 Id. at 338–39. 
 301 See Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 08-563, 2016 WL 
4720058, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2016); Vangjeli v. Banks, No. 19-1635, 2020 
WL 5880131, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2020) (discussing difference between deriv-
ative sovereign immunity and official immunity doctrines). 
 302 See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405–06 (4th Cir. 1986); 
Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.J. Case Co., 
756 F.2d 591, 596–97 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l, 704 F.2d 444, 
448 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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activities exception.”303 As with the application of the political ques-
tion doctrine, there has been disparate treatment by the courts in de-
termining the applicability and scope of these defenses. 
Several Circuit Court decisions initially adopted the government 
contractor defense304 as an adjunct to the Feres doctrine.305 These 
courts concluded that to allow claims against contractors for injuries 
to Armed Service personnel sustained in the course of military ser-
vice would defeat the purpose behind the Feres doctrine since the 
increased cost of the contractor’s tort liability would be added to 
contracts, which “pass-through costs . . . would . . . defeat the pur-
pose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the gov-
ernment itself.”306 
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. which involved a suit 
against a helicopter manufacturer by the family of a Marine pilot, 
who drowned following a crash because he could not get the emer-
gency hatch to open, the Supreme Court recognized the defense, but 
rejected the underlying analysis utilized by these lower courts.307 
Noting that sovereign immunity does not apply to private entities, 
the Court instead turned to a preemption analysis: 
Petitioner’s broadest contention is that, in the ab-
sence of legislation specifically immunizing Govern-
ment contractors from liability for design defects, 
there is no basis for judicial recognition of such a de-
fense. We disagree. In most fields of activity, to be 
sure, this Court has refused to find federal pre-emp-
tion of state law in the absence of either a clear stat-
utory prescription, or a direct conflict between fed-
eral and state law. But we have held that a few areas, 
involving “uniquely federal interests,” are so com-
mitted by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States to federal control that state law is pre-empted 
and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a 
 
 303 See, e.g., Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
 304 See, e.g., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 403; Bynum, 770 F.2d at 556; Tillett, 756 F.2d 
at 591; McKay, 704 F.2d at 444. 
 305 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 306 See, e.g., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408. 
 307 487 U.S. 500, 502–03, 510 (1988). 
212 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
 
content prescribed (absent explicit statutory di-
rective) by the courts — so-called “federal common 
law.” 
The dispute in the present case borders upon two ar-
eas that we have found to involve such “uniquely 
federal interests.” We have held that obligations to 
and rights of the United States under its contracts are 
governed exclusively by federal law. 
Another area that we have found to be of peculiarly 
federal concern, warranting the displacement of state 
law, is the civil liability of federal officials for ac-
tions taken in the course of their duty. We have held 
in many contexts that the scope of that liability is 
controlled by federal law. The present case involves 
an independent contractor performing its obligation 
under a procurement contract, rather than an official 
performing his duty as a federal employee, but there 
is obviously implicated the same interest in getting 
the Government’s work done.308 
Although finding that the procurement of military equipment by 
the United States was an area of “uniquely federal interest,” the 
Court held that this alone was not enough to preempt state law al-
lowing tort recovery.309 Instead, it concluded that preemption would 
only occur where: “a ‘significant conflict’ exists between an identi-
fiable ‘federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,’ or 
the application of state law would ‘frustrate specific objectives’ of 
federal legislation.”310 
The Court then looked to the discretionary function exception to 
the Federal Tort Claims Act311 as the basis for determining whether 
such a “significant conflict” existed: 
 
 308 Id. at 504–05 (citations omitted). 
 309 Id. at 507–08. 
 310 Id. at 507 (citations omitted). 
 311 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (excepting “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty” 
from the waiver of sovereign immunity). 
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We think that the selection of the appropriate design 
for military equipment to be used by our Armed 
Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within 
the meaning of this provision. It often involves not 
merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the 
balancing of many technical, military, and even so-
cial considerations, including specifically the trade-
off between greater safety and greater combat effec-
tiveness. And we are further of the view that permit-
ting “second-guessing” of these judgments through 
state tort suits against contractors would produce the 
same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA ex-
emption.312 
As a result, the Court went on to hold that this test would only 
be met in claims against manufacturers based upon alleged design 
defects in military equipment when: (1) the government approved 
the precise specifications, (2) the equipment complied with the spec-
ifications, and (3) the supplier warned the government purchaser of 
the dangers in the use of the equipment.313 
As noted by some lower court decisions, “[s]tripped to its essen-
tials, the military contractor’s defense under Boyle is to claim, ‘The 
Government made me do it.’”314 
Subsequent lower court decisions have reached divergent con-
clusions over the reach of Boyle. Some cases have refused to extend 
the defense beyond its origins, limiting it to those product liability 
 
 312 487 U.S. at 511 (citations omitted). 
 313 Id. at 512. Multiple circuit court decisions have weighed whether military 
contractors have carried their burden of establishing these elements. See Getz v. 
Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding summary judgment for 
contractor which designed helicopter pursuant to government approved specifica-
tions that did not call for safety device that may have prevented crash); Brinson 
v. Raytheon Co., 571 F.3d 1348, 1349 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judg-
ment for the designer of the military aircraft). 
 314 Copeland v. 3M Co., No. 20-1490 (JRT/KMM), 2020 WL 5748114, at *2 
(D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2020) (finding the government contractor defense inapplica-
ble to claims of hearing damage against a manufacturer of combat arms earplugs) 
(quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. New York Asbestos Litig. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 
Inc., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
214 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
 
design cases where the three express conditions are met.315 Other 
courts have extended the defense beyond merely negligent design to 
other products liability type claims involving the negligent manu-
facture of military products,316 failure to warn of product dangers,317 
and even to the provision of maintenance services.318 
Still, others have stretched Boyle beyond the provision of prod-
ucts and maintenance services to immunize other activities by con-
tractors for which the military would be protected by sovereign im-
munity, such as in the cases arising out of the abuses of prisoners of 
war at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.319 These latter deci-
sions have created a new hybrid type defense based upon the “com-
bat activities exception” to the FTCA, which provides that the gov-
ernment does not waive its sovereign immunity from suits regarding 
“[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military 
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”320 
One of the leading cases to adopt this new hybrid defense is 
Koohi v. United States, in which the Ninth Circuit construed Boyle 
to bar wrongful death claims arising from the shooting down of an 
Iranian civilian plane carrying 290 passengers by the USS Vin-
cennes.321 Using the Aegis Air Defense System, manufactured by 
 
 315 See, e.g., Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 272 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (analyzing the case of a Navy enlisted man injured in the collapse of a 
nuclear reactor facility); Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615–16 (S.D. 
Tex. 2005) (refusing to apply defense to claims by civilians injured and killed in 
convoy operated by contractors, which were attacked by insurgents in Iraq). 
 316 See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995–96, 
1001–02 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying defense to cases based upon negligent manu-
facture). 
 317 See, e.g., Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150, 1151–52,1156–58 (6th 
Cir. 1995); Getz, 654 F.3d at 867. The Ninth Circuit limited its prior opinion in 
Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 1996), which had re-
fused to apply the defense to a failure to warn case. 
 318 Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 
2003) (holding defense available to service contractor for the alleged negligent 
failure to discover a stress crack in fin spar that led to crash of Army helicopter, 
where it followed government’s maintenance procedures); LaCourse v. PAE 
Worldwide, Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1362 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming summary judg-
ment for contractor which allegedly failed to properly service and maintain F-16 
that crashed, killing pilot). 
 319 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 320 28 U.S.C. §2680(j) (emphasis added). 
 321 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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several government contractors, the battleship mistook the civilian 
airbus for an Iranian F-14 during a time of heightened hostilities be-
tween the United States and Iran arising out of the decade-long Iran-
Iraq war.322 
Although acknowledging that sovereign immunity would not di-
rectly shield the private contractors that had manufactured the Aegis 
system from liability, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the application 
of the FTCA’s combatant activities exception nevertheless removed 
any duty of care owed by either the government or the contractors 
“to those against whom force is directed as a result of authorized 
military action.”323 Reading Boyle as holding “preemption [to be] 
appropriate when imposition of liability on [a] defense contractor 
‘will produce [the] same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA 
exception,”324 the Ninth Circuit went on to conclude that liability 
therefore could not be asserted against the contractors for the same 
reason as against the government.325 
In Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., a California district court 
judge relied upon Koohi to expand Boyle’s reach even further in a 
case arising from the death of six Marines during the first Gulf War 
due to an errant missile strike by a U.S. Air Force jet.326 In suing the 
manufacturer for a claimed defect in the missile’s guidance system, 
the plaintiffs tried to circumvent Boyle by claiming that the missile 
was defectively manufactured, rather than improperly designed.327 
The government took the unusual step of intervening in the lawsuit 
to assert that the continued progression of the case would damage 
national security, since it would result in the disclosure of highly 
classified information concerning the design of its Maverick missile 
system.328 
 
 322 Id. at 1329–30. 
 323 Id. at 1337. 
 324 Id. Interestingly, the court did not reference the earlier decision of a differ-
ent panel from the circuit in Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267 
(9th Cir. 1990), which utilized a straight analysis of the three Boyle factors to hold 
that the government contractor defense was inapplicable to a suit by a Navy en-
listed man in the collapse of a nuclear reactor facility. 
 325 Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 326 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1487, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
 327 Id.at 1489.  
 328 Id. at 1496–97. 
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Although the court could have easily remained on the path of 
existing precedent by dismissing the case on the limited grounds that 
Boyle applied to claims of both design and manufacturing defects or 
by simply relying upon the state secrets doctrine,329 it instead em-
barked upon a broad tirade against allowing recovery for any war 
time injuries as an affront to “military dignity,” regardless of cause 
or responsibility:330 
“War produces innumerable innocent victims of 
harmful conduct—on all sides. It would make little 
sense to single out for special compensation a few of 
these persons . . . on the basis that they have suffered 
from the negligence of our military forces rather than 
from the overwhelming and pervasive violence 
which each side intentionally inflicts on the other.” 
This principle applies even when the suit is against a 
government contractor, rather than the government 
itself. There can be no difference in compensation for 
those that die in war, even when the cause is a man-
ufacturing defect. 
Indeed, the federal interest in maintaining the mili-
tary dignity of casualties suffered by soldiers fighting 
a war on behalf of the United States would be harmed 
by allowing soldiers killed or injured in war to bring 
suits against military contractors. Unfortunately, sol-
diers die and are injured in combat. Casualties are 
contemplated prior to war and judged to be a neces-
sary consequence of the decision to go to war.331 
Implicit in the court’s reasoning is the view that soldiers are war 
time expendables that do not deserve the same protections of the law 
for their safety as afforded to everyday consumers, because of the 
perceived need for military weapons manufacturers to avoid delays 
necessary to make their products safe:332 
 
 329 See id. at 1492. The court found both defenses applicable to the case. For 
a more detailed discussion of the state secrets doctrine, see infra Section II. D. 
 330 Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp at 1494. 
 331 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 332 Id. at 1493–94. 
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[T]ort law is based in large part on deterrence; tort 
liability is meant to make tortfeasors more care-
ful . . . . During wartime, manufacturers similarly 
should not be made overly cautious in the production 
and transportation of weapons . . . . Exposing gov-
ernment contractors to tort liability, even for manu-
facturing defects, would place undue pressure on 
manufacturers to act too cautiously, even when the 
national interest would be better served by expedient 
production than defect-free weapons.333 
This same rationale also formed the basis for the dismissal of a 
products liability suit against the manufacturer of a pilot’s safety 
equipment, which was claimed to have caused his death when his 
Apache helicopter crashed in Afghanistan, in Flanigan v. Westwind 
Technologies, Inc.334 Building upon Bentzlin’s argument that man-
ufacturers of military weapons should not be bogged down by the 
tort system’s concern for making safe products, the court went on to 
urge blanket immunity for such manufacturers by perversely twist-
ing Koohi’s statement that the FTCA’s combatant activities excep-
tion removed any duty of care owed to enemy combatants to apply 
with equal vigor to “actions arising from the deaths of American 
soldiers in combat based upon product liability.”335 
The radical extension of Boyle by these cases has been rejected 
by many courts utilizing a variety of different rationales. Some 
courts have refused to apply the combatant activities exception to 
cases arising outside of the product liability field, reasoning that tort 
judgments in such cases will not subvert  “any sophisticated design 
judgments or nuanced exercises of [military] discretion” inherent in 
the procurement process, which constituted a critical aspect of 
Boyle’s analysis.336 Other courts have rejected the application of the 
 
 333 Id. at 1493. 
 334 648 F. Supp. 2d 994, 995, 1007 (W.D. Tenn. 2008). 
 335 Id. at 1004–05. 
 336 McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689, 692 
(D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he discretionary function exception does not apply to a mis-
take or defect in manufacturing. Such a process error is not a governmental, dis-
cretionary decision.”); see Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 710, 720–21 
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (refusing to apply the defense to claims arising out of the negli-
gent operation of a convoy in Iraq); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., 
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defense by taking a restrictive view of the nature of the required 
“combatant” activities.337 
Still others have taken a fact-based approach to determine 
whether the purposes of tort law would be met by allowing the case 
to go forward. For example, in Getz v. Boeing Co., a different Cali-
fornia district judge contrasted the plaintiffs in the case before him, 
who were the survivors of U.S. military personnel that died in a hel-
icopter crash in Afghanistan, with the plaintiffs in Koohi, who were 
citizens of Iran, which was involved in military hostilities with the 
United States at the time. 338 
Using this analysis, she construed Koohi as “focus[ing] on 
whether the purposes of tort law would be furthered by requiring 
weapons manufacturers to extend a duty of care to ‘enemy forces or 
persons associated with those forces,’” which it answered in the neg-
ative.339 Getz, on the other hand, “concern[ed] extending the duty of 
care to United States servicemen, the people the helicopter was de-
signed to protect.”340 The lack of a duty of care owed to enemies in 
 
Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1377–81 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (refusing to apply to injuries 
arising from the negligent operation of a vehicle in a convoy by a  contractor’s 
employee); Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 1342823, at *5 
(S.D. Tex. May 16, 2006) (refusing to apply to claim for injuries caused by neg-
ligent security which allowed suicide bomber entry into Army mess hall). 
 337 See, e.g., Brokaw v. Boeing Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 
2015) (holding that the transportation of military equipment by plane into a war 
zone did not constitute a combatant activity, while questioning whether the de-
fense can be applied to contractors); McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 
654, 666 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding contractor responsible for water and waste 
treatment at U.S. bases in Iraq did not involve combatant activity), appeal dis-
missed, No. 12–20763, 2013 WL 8359992 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2013); Linfoot v. MD 
Helicopters, Inc., No. 3:09–0639, 2010 WL 4659482, at *7–8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 
9, 2010) (holding a helicopter crash in Iraq occurring as a result of  a product 
defect rather than enemy fire did not constitute combatant activity); Rodriguez v. 
General Dynamics Armament and Tech. Prods., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1186–
89 (D. Hawaii 2010) (holding the combatant activities exception did not extend 
to injuries caused by a premature exploding motor round during training exercises 
in Hawaii). But see Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs. Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 
698,711–13 (the design, operation and maintenance of toilet facilities located on 
a forward operating base was held to constitute combatant activity). 
 338 Getz v. Boeing Co., No. C 07–06396 CW., 2009 WL 636039, at *4–6 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2009). 
 339 Id. at *4. 
 340 Id. 
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war does not apply to our own military personnel.”341 Accordingly, 
the court found the combatant activity exception inapplicable.342 
Similarly, McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp.343 criticized 
the express reliance in Koohi and Bentzlin upon the perceived need 
to free weapons manufacturers from the safety constraints of the tort 
system, which would require them to “exercise great caution at a 
time when bold and imaginative measures might be necessary to 
overcome enemy forces . . . .”344 
True, the duty of care should not constrain our sol-
diers from taking “bold and imaginative measures” 
in battle. But reckless bravery is not the quality we 
look for in a supplier of materiel. A manufacturer like 
General Dynamics should not act in a spirit of bold 
improvisation; it should follow specifications scru-
pulously and exercise the highest level of care in the 
manufacturing process.345 
McMahon went on to take further aim at the rationale expressed 
by those cases claiming that it was necessary to sacrifice the safety 
of soldiers in a time of war:346 
I am not persuaded by all of Bentzlin’s reasoning. I 
am not convinced, for example, that fear of claims 
like McMahon’s would induce General Dynamics to 
slow down its operations. Nor does anyone claim that 
a military exigency required that General Dynamics 
relax its safety standards to hasten production. I can-
not meaningfully correlate the need to encourage 
“bold and imaginative” battle tactics to the manner 
or the rate at which guns come off of a U.S. assembly 
 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. at *4–6. 
 343 McMahon v. General Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (D.N.J. 
2013) (refusing to apply the combatant activity exception to shield a manufacturer 
from a claim by a soldier who was allegedly injured as a result of a defect in a 
machine gun causing it to misfire). 
 344 Id. at 690 (quoting Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328,1334–35 (9th 
Cir. 1992)). 
 345 McMahon, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 690. 
 346 Id. at 691–92. 
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line. Nor do I believe that tort law loses its salutary 
capacity to encourage care, punish negligence and 
spread the cost of accidents, simply because the cus-
tomer happens to be the government . . . . The tort 
system, here as elsewhere, can help enforce the high-
est standard of care in the production of the equip-
ment upon which our servicemen and servicewomen 
rely. That safety and deterrence rationale, of course, 
has no application to the enemy, as Koohi im-
plies . . . . It is a fact of life that the enemy seeks to 
injure us; that is no reason to forgo the best means 
we have of ensuring that we do not injure our-
selves.347 
Other cases have recognized the combatant activities exception 
but have rejected the Koohi approach to determine its applicability, 
instead focusing upon the extent of the government’s control over 
the activity in question. One such case is Saleh v. Titan Corp., which 
involved claims brought by several Iraqi detainees against military 
contractors based upon their torture in the infamous Abu Ghraib 
prison by both U.S. servicemen and the contractors’ employees.348 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the defense would 
only apply to contractors, “[d]uring wartime, where a private service 
contractor is integrated into combatant activities over which the mil-
itary retains command authority . . . .”349 
From a legal standpoint, the rationale for transforming the lim-
ited government contractor defense into a new broad scale combat-
ant activities exception is conceptually unsound for a number of rea-
sons. The essence of the government contractor defense is that the 
manufacturer is immune from being sued because it followed the 
military’s specifications in designing a weapons system.350 
 
 347 Id. 
 348 580 F.3d 1, 1–2 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 349 Id. at 9. In Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 
481–82 (3d Cir. 2013), the Third Circuit adopted this test, finding the defense 
inapplicable to the claim of a soldier, who was electrocuted while taking a shower 
as a result of the negligent installation of an ungrounded water pump, because the 
Army did not retain control over the manner in which the contractor installed the 
pump. 
 350 Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2011). 
2021] BLACKWATER RISING 221 
 
Nevertheless, it is well settled that such a contractual relationship 
with the government will not vest the private contractor with sover-
eign immunity.351 
As explained in Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc.,352 in refusing 
to extend sovereign immunity to a grenade manufacturer for a Vi-
etnam training accident, 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity may not be ex-
tended to cover the fault of a private corporation, no 
matter how intimate its connection with the govern-
ment.353 
. . . Therefore, the government does not become the 
conduit of its immunity in suits against its agents and 
instrumentalities merely because they do its work.354 
This principle was reiterated more recently in the context of the 
recent wars in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.355 
A private contractor that operates with “private profit 
objectives in operating under [a] contract” is “an en-
tity distinct from the government,” though the two 
are contractually linked . . . . 
. . . Defendants entered into the contract as a com-
mercial endeavor. They provided a service for a 
price. Simply because the service was provided in the 
mountains of Afghanistan during armed conflict 
does not render Defendants, or their personnel, mem-
bers of the military or employees of the Govern-
ment.356 
As such, Boyle expressly recognized that private military con-
tractors were not entitled to sovereign immunity and accordingly, 
 
 351 Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, 502 F.2d 867, 874 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 352 Id. 
 353 Id. at 874 (and cases cited therein). 
 354 Id. at 874 n. 6 (and cases cited therein). 
 355 McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1326 (M.D. 
Fla. 2006) aff’d 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (and cases cited therein). 
 356 Id. at 1326–27. 
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did not utilize the exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity 
applicable to the government set forth in the FTCA to create analo-
gous defenses for private contractors.357 Instead, it looked to the dis-
cretionary function exception of the Act (28 U.S.C. §2680(a)) solely 
for the purpose of determining whether the FTCA preempted state 
tort claims arising out of the government’s exercise of its discretion 
in one discrete specific area, the selection of specifications for mili-
tary weapons.358 As a result, Boyle clearly does not support the at-
tempt to utilize the FTCA to create a system of parallel sovereign 
immunity-like defenses for private contractors.359 
The broad scope of the combatant activities exception also 
clearly exceeds the limited nature of the government contractor de-
fense recognized by the Supreme Court in Boyle. As pointed out by 
the court in Saleh, Boyle requires that for the government contractor 
defense to apply, 
one must discover a discrete discretionary govern-
mental decision, which precludes suits based on that 
decision, [the combatant activities exception] is more 
like a field preemption . . . because it casts an im-
munity net over any claim that arises out of combat-
ant activities.360 
Accordingly, the reasoning expressed in cases like Koohi, 
Bentzlin, and Flanigan is clearly at odds with the underlying ra-
tionale of Boyle. As a result, the district court in McMahon, rejected 
the analytical framework underlying this hybrid defense by observ-
ing, 
Whether the Bentzlin and Koohi courts unwittingly 
confused the government contractor defense and the 
combatant activities exception to the FTCA, or 
whether they crafted an entirely new defense based 
on sovereign immunity and federal preemption, this 
Court declines to endorse such a defense for private 
 
 357 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 502, 510–13 (1988). 
 358 Id. at 511–12. 
 359 Id. at 510. 
 360 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (and cases cited 
therein). 
2021] BLACKWATER RISING 223 
 
contractors based solely on the fact that Defendants 
were operating in a combat zone. This Court can find 
no persuasive authority for the conclusion that the 
combatant exception preempts state tort law claims. 
The combatant activities exception to the FTCA is an 
explicit legislative preservation of sovereign immun-
ity, while the government contractor defense is a ju-
dicially recognized affirmative defense grounded in 
federal preemption and the discretionary function ex-
ception to the FTCA. The latter defense shields con-
tractors only in military equipment procurement con-
tracts and only when the government dictates design 
specifications. Private contractors are not entitled to 
sovereign immunity unless they are characterized as 
government employees, which Defendants are 
not.361 
The court therefore went on to hold, 
There is no express authority for judicially intermix-
ing the government contractor defense and the com-
batant activities exception; nor is there authority for 
bestowing a private actor with the shield of sovereign 
immunity . . . . Unless they qualify as employees or 
agents of the Government, private contractors may 
not bootstrap the Government’s sovereign immun-
ity.362 
D. The State Secrets Doctrine 
Like many other issues involving military contractors, the state 
secrets doctrine has resulted in differing opinions regarding both its 
scope and application. Some cases have treated it as an evidentiary 
privilege affecting only the admissibility of so-called state secrets, 
allowing the case to go forward minus the privileged evidence.363 
Other cases, however, have given it a pre-emptive effect requiring 
 
 361 McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (M.D. 
Fla. 2006) aff’d 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (and cases cited therein). 
 362 Id. (emphasis added). 
 363 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077–80 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
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the dismissal of the entire litigation, even where the parties can still 
establish their claims and defenses through nonprivileged and some-
times even public evidence.364 
The state secrets doctrine has its origins in a suit brought by the 
estate of a southern Civil War spy, which sued the federal govern-
ment for breaching a secret agreement made with President Lincoln 
to compensate the spy for his war time espionage services.365 In Tot-
ten v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld Lincoln’s authority 
“to employ secret agents” to spy on behalf of the government,366 
however, it affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit. The Court rea-
soned that the nature of the underlying agreement was part of a class 
of “secret employments.”367 As a result, the Court went on to hold: 
It may be stated as a general principle, that public 
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court 
of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to 
the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards 
as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow 
the confidence to be violated . . . . Much greater rea-
son exists for the application of the principle to cases 
of contract for secret services with the government, 
as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a 
fact not to be disclosed.368 
Seventy-seven years later, the Supreme Court referenced Totten 
in a footnote, but did not otherwise appear to rely upon it, in United 
States v. Reynolds.369 In Reynolds, the families of three civilian con-
tractors who died in the crash of an Air Force plane on a highly se-
cret mission sought the discovery of highly classified investigative 
reports as part of their suit for recovery against the government un-
der the FTCA.370 The case arrived at the Court following the Third 
 
 364 Id. 
 365 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105–06 (1876). 
 366 Id. at 106. 
 367 Id. (“[S]ecret employments of the government in time of war, or upon mat-
ters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the service might com-
promise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or endanger the person 
or injure the character of the agent.”). 
 368 Id. at 107. 
 369 345 U.S. 1, n.11 (1953). 
 370 Id. at 1. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals affirmance of a default judgement entered 
against the government as a sanction for refusing to produce the doc-
uments after the district court overruled the Air Force’s objection 
based upon privilege.371 
In reversing the lower courts’ orders requiring the production of 
the reports, the Court formally recognized the existence of an evi-
dentiary privilege for military and state secrets, which allows the 
U.S. government to block discovery in a lawsuit of any information 
that, if disclosed, would adversely affect national security.372 The 
Court subsequently explained in General Dynamics Corp. v. U.S., 
that its holding in “Reynolds was about the admission of evi-
dence.”373 “It decided a purely evidentiary dispute by applying evi-
dentiary rules.”374 The Court described that in Reynolds “the privi-
leged information [was] excluded and the trial [went] on without 
it.”375 
At the same time, General Dynamics breathed new life into the 
Court’s earlier Totten decision, treating it as a corollary of the state 
secrets doctrine under which it was appropriate to dismiss entire ac-
tions under some circumstances.376 General Dynamics involved a 
lawsuit by the manufacturer of a stealth aircraft over the conse-
quences of the cancellation of its multi-billion dollar contract with 
 
 371 The claim of privilege was based upon an Air Force regulation exempting 
such reports from public disclosure that was enacted under the authority of 5 
U.S.C. § 5 (now 5 U.S.C.§ 22). United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 1 (1953). 
In Touhy v. Ragen, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of executive agencies 
to enact such regulations. 340 U.S. 462, 469–470 (1951). Initially, the government 
did not raise the claim in the district court that the documents constituted state 
secrets. See sub nom. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 472–73 (E.D. Pa. 
1950) (“the Government does not here contend that this is a case involving the 
well-recognized common law privilege protecting state secrets or facts which 
might seriously harm the Government in its diplomatic relations, military opera-
tions or measures for national security”). Subsequent to the district court’s initial 
ruling sustaining the plaintiffs’ motion to compel, however, the Judge Advocate 
General of the Air Force filed an affidavit stating that the production would “se-
riously hamper[] national security . . . and the development of . . . secret military 
equipment.” Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 372 Reynolds, 192 F.2d 987 at 996. 
 373 563 U.S. 478, 485 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 374 Id. 
 375 Id. (emphasis added). 
 376 Id. at 486–87. 
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the Air Force.377 In support of its claim that the military had misled 
it at the bidding stage, the contractor relied upon the principle rec-
ognized in such cases that the Air Force had withheld “‘superior 
knowledge’ of difficult-to-discover information ‘vital’ to contrac-
tual performance.”378 
To establish such “superior knowledge,” it was necessary to in-
quire into the Air Force’s prior experiences with stealth technology 
in other projects.379 Although disclosing some information regard-
ing these earlier applications, the Air Force refused to provide all of 
the information requested on the grounds that it constituted a privi-
leged military secret.380 
In dismissing the lawsuit, despite the existence of sufficient non-
privileged evidence to make a prima facie showing of the applica-
tion of the government’s superior knowledge of the technical prob-
lems facing the building of the subject stealth aircraft, the Court dis-
tinguished Reynolds and returned to Totten,381 
[the lower court’s] perception that in the present con-
text the state-secrets issue raises something quite dif-
ferent from a mere evidentiary point seems to us 
sound. What we are called upon to exercise is not our 
power to determine the procedural rules of evidence, 
but our common-law authority to fashion contractual 
remedies in Government-contracting disputes. And 
our state-secrets jurisprudence bearing upon that au-
thority is not Reynolds, but two cases dealing with 
alleged contracts to spy.382 
The “two cases”383 relied upon by the Court were Totten and its 
modern-day counterpart Tenet v. Doe, which involved the CIA’s 
claimed breach of a contract with a spy during the Cold War. 384 In 
Tenet, the Court reversed the lower courts’ refusal to dismiss the 
 
 377 Id. at 481. 
 378 Id. 
 379 Id. at 481–82. 
 380 Id. at 482. 
 381 Id. at 485. 
 382 Id. at 485–86 (internal citation omitted). 
 383 Id. at 486. 
 384 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 1 (2005). 
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lawsuit and expressly rejected the argument that Reynolds had “re-
cast [Totten] simply as an early expression of the evidentiary ‘state 
secrets’ privilege, rather than a categorical bar to [plaintiffs’] 
claims.”385 Although the Court’s language in Tenet focused on the 
need to keep spy contracts secret, General Dynamics clearly ex-
panded the applicability of the complete bar in some state secrets 
cases beyond just espionage lawsuits.386 
Unfortunately, General Dynamics did not address the question 
of when the state secrets doctrine crosses the line from an eviden-
tiary privilege to a complete bar, kicking that can down the road by 
observing, 
what we promulgate today is not a statute but a com-
mon-law opinion, which, after the fashion of the 
common law, is subject to further refinement where 
relevant factors significantly different from those be-
fore us here counsel a different outcome.387 
In subsequently wrestling with the issue of where to draw this 
line, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals surveyed the prior circuit 
court decisions in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,388 which 
involved a suit against military contractors by Iraqi nationals who 
had been taken to black sites for the purposes of the CIA’s “so-called 
‘extraordinary rendition program.’”389 
Ordinarily, simply excluding or otherwise walling 
off the privileged information may suffice to protect 
the state secrets and “the case will proceed accord-
ingly, with no consequences save those resulting 
from the loss of evidence.” 
 
 385 Id. at 8. 
 386 General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 486 (2011). 
 387 Id. at 491. 
 388 614 F.3d 1070, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted); see 
also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 152–54 (D.C. Cir. 2007); El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007); Bareford v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1992); Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 545 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 389 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
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In some instances, however, application of the privi-
lege may require dismissal of the action. When this 
point is reached, the Reynolds privilege converges 
with the Totten bar, because both require dismissal. 
There are three circumstances when the Reynolds 
privilege would justify terminating a case. 
First, if “the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie 
elements of her claim with nonprivileged evidence, 
then the court may dismiss her claim as it would with 
any plaintiff who cannot prove her case.” Second, 
“‘if the privilege deprives the defendant of infor-
mation that would otherwise give the defendant a 
valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant 
summary judgment to the defendant.’” 
Third, and relevant here, even if the claims and de-
fenses might theoretically be established without re-
lying on privileged evidence, it may be impossible to 
proceed with the litigation because—privileged evi-
dence being inseparable from nonprivileged infor-
mation that will be necessary to the claims or de-
fenses—litigating the case to a judgment on the mer-
its would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing 
state secrets.390 
Although more typically applied where the plaintiff is the party 
seeking so-claimed secret information, as noted in the above quota-
tion from Mohamed, the privilege may also come into play where 
the information inures to the benefit of the defendant.391 In such 
cases, it has been held that a dismissal (or defense summary judg-
ment) is appropriate where the exclusion of the evidence “so ham-
pers the defendant in establishing a valid defense that the trier is 
likely to reach an erroneous conclusion,”392 or where it deprives the 
 
 390 Id. at 1082–83. 
 391 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 148 (D. C. Cir. 2007). 
 392 Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547. 
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defendant of information that would otherwise give it a valid de-
fense to the claim.393 
Where, however, the withholding of the privileged information 
will not foreclose the possibility of a fair trial, the case will be al-
lowed to proceed, but without the requested information.394 In such 
cases, individual claims or defenses may be stricken if dependent 
upon the privileged information.395 
The privilege has been held to apply in a variety of different con-
texts, including to block production of “information that would re-
sult in ‘impairment of the nation’s defense capabilities, disclosure 
of intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, and disruption of 
diplomatic relations with foreign governments,’ or where disclosure 
‘would be inimical to national security . . . .’”396 It is not necessary 
for the United States or its agencies to be a party to the litigation, 
however, only the government may assert the claim.397 
For the privilege to apply in the military context, the court need 
only be satisfied that “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion 
of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of 
national security, should not be divulged.”398 Where the privilege is 
properly invoked, “even the most compelling necessity cannot 
 
 393 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 148–49. See also General Dynamics Corp., 
563 U.S. at 486–87; White v. Raytheon Co., No. 07–10222–RGS, 2008 WL 
5273290, at *1, *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008) (suit by wife of Navy pilot shot down 
in friendly fire incident while on patrol in Iraq by defective Patriot missile dis-
missed where the application of the state secrets doctrine deprived the manufac-
turer of necessary information to establish its claimed defenses); Bareford v. Gen-
eral Dynamic Co., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141–43 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 394 DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that where quashing defendant’s subpoena on the U.S. for documents pro-
tected by the state secrets doctrine did not foreclose possibility of fair trial, the 
case would not be dismissed); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 141, 154 (holding 
Bivens action filed by DEA employee against State Department for Fourth 
Amendment violations would be allowed to proceed because of the existence of 
alternate sources of evidence). 
 395 See S.E.C. v. Naccio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168–69 (D. Colo. 2009) 
(“[W]here a defendant will be deprived of the privilege, the court may dismiss the 
affected claims against that defendant.”). 
 396 Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 397 Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 398 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
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overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied 
that military secrets are at stake.”399 
Because of its breadth and severe effect, it has been repeatedly 
recognized that the privilege may not be lightly applied.400 “[W]hen-
ever possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from non-
sensitive information to allow for the release of the latter.”401 
An important procedural safeguard imposed upon its application 
is the requirement that only the head of the relevant government 
agency may assert the formal claim and only after a personal review 
of the matter.402 Other subordinate officials may, however, file dec-
larations in support of the objection once it is asserted by the depart-
ment head.403 
Although the judiciary is charged with making the final deter-
mination of whether the privilege applies, the Supreme Court has 
admonished that courts must be careful to avoid “forcing a disclo-
sure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”404 In as-
sessing the risk of disclosure, courts traditionally show the utmost 
deference to executive assertions of privilege or presidential respon-
sibilities upon grounds of military or diplomatic secret.405 Further-
more, judicial review of such a claim of privilege is necessarily nar-
row.406 
While observing that “[j]udicial control over the evidence can-
not be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers,” the Court in 
Reynolds went on to caution “we will not go so far as to say that the 
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge 
before the claim will be accepted in any case.”407 To strike this bal-
ance from a practical standpoint, the Supreme Court has stated that 
courts should first attempt to determine whether the application of 
 
 399 Id. at 11. 
 400 Id. at 7. See also General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 
492 (2011) (“[the privilege] is the option of last resort, available in a very narrow 
set of circumstances.”). 
 401 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 402 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8; Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th 
Cir. 1995). 
 403 Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 404 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. 
 405 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 713 (1974).  
 406 Id. 
 407 Reynolds, 345 U.S at 9–10. 
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the privilege can be established by extrinsic evidence, in which case 
an in camera inspection of the privileged information is not appro-
priate.408 As explained by the Court, “When . . . the occasion for the 
privilege is appropriate, . . . the court should not jeopardize the se-
curity which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an 
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in cham-
bers.”409 
The privilege has been typically held to apply in cases involving 
claims of defective military armaments, such as claimed failures in 
friendly aircraft identification systems,410 missile targeting equip-
ment,411or missile defense systems.412 As with other products liabil-
ity cases involving non-military products, cases of this nature re-
quire the production of design and manufacturing specifications, 
product performance standards, quality control processes, training 
materials, records of prior system failures, and internal analysis of 
product capabilities and vulnerabilities.413 In the military context, 
these materials almost always contain classified information. 414 
Claims of military equipment failures raise their own unique is-
sues as well. While most product liability claims raise causation is-
sues revolving around the question of whether the product was used 
properly, in the military context this issue often requires an analysis 
of whether the operators properly followed Rules of Engagement 
and/or their training procedures, which are normally classified.415 
 
 408 Id. at 10. See also El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 
2007); Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 548 (rejecting re-
quest for in camera inspection in suit for deaths of Navy sailors alleging that de-
fects in missile defense system failed to repel Iraq air attack). 
 409 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 410 Mounsey v. Allied-Signal, Inc., No. CV 95-4309 SVW (MCx), 2000 WL 
34017116, at *1 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 2000); White v. Raytheon Co., No. 07–
10222–RGS, 2008 WL 5273290, at *1, *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008). 
 411 Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp 1486, 1487 (C. D. Cal. 1993). 
 412 Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 544, 546 (analyzing the purported failure of the 
Phalanx Anti-Missile System); Bareford v. General Dynamic Co., 973 F.2d 1138, 
1140 (5th Cir. 1992) (analyzing the claimed flaws of the Phalanx military weapon 
system). 
 413 See, e.g., Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1496–97. 
 414 Id. 
 415 See, e.g., Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547; Mounsey, 2000 WL 34017116 at 
*2, *8. 
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Another area where the privilege has come into play has been in 
suits arising out of claimed torture during alleged illegal renditions 
by the CIA and military contractors.416 In El-Masri v. U.S.,417 the 
court dismissed the suit of a German national, who had been arrested 
by Macedonian authorities and subsequently transferred to a CIA 
black site in Afghanistan, despite the plaintiff’s claim that the CIA’s 
rendition program was widely known and extensively reported in 
the media.418 The court concluded that even though the general sub-
ject matter of such renditions was known, the specific facts neces-
sary to prove the plaintiff’s case were not.419 
To establish a prima facie case, he would be obliged 
to produce admissible evidence not only that he was 
detained and interrogated, but that the [specific] de-
fendants were involved in his detention and interro-
gation in a manner that renders them personally lia-
ble to him. Such a showing could be made only with 
evidence that exposes how the CIA organizes, staffs, 
and supervises its most sensitive intelligence opera-
tions.420 
Although there is a legitimate need for a government secrets 
privilege, in the absence of strict and well-defined rules for its ap-
plication, there is potential for abuse, including the denial of com-
pensation to the families of military personnel who die needlessly as 
a result of the negligence of government contractors. Bareford v. 
General Dynamic Co.421 presents a good example of such potential. 
In this case, the families of thirty-seven Navy sailors, who were 
killed by a missile strike on the U.S.S. Stark during the Iran-Iraq 
War, brought suit against the manufacturers of the ship’s Phalanx 
defense system contending that its defects led to the success of the 
attack.422 
 
 416 El Maris, v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 417 Id. at 302. 
 418 Id. at 300–02. 
 419 Id. at 308–09. 
 420 Id. at 309. 
 421 Bareford v. General Dynamic Co., 973 F.2d 1138, 1142 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 422 Id. at 1138, 1140. 
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The plaintiffs produced over 2,500 pages of unclassified docu-
ments in support of their claims, including eleven Congressional re-
ports, which the court acknowledged provided “substantial evidence 
from which a judge or jury might find problems, or even wrongdo-
ing, by General Dynamics in its production and testing of the Phal-
anx system.”423 Although the Department of Navy did not challenge 
any of these documents, the court accepted its contention that dis-
missal was still required: 
[t]he government maintains that, even if the data is 
available from non-secret sources, acknowledgment 
of this information by government officers would 
still be damaging to the government, because the 
acknowledgement would lend credibility to the unof-
ficial data. These cases stand for the proposition that 
disclosure of information by government officials 
can be prejudicial to government interests, even if the 
information has already been divulged from non-
government sources.424 
E. Arbitration 
Over recent years there has been a tendency among industries, 
especially those which either employ foreign workers or hire U.S. 
citizens for jobs overseas, to incorporate arbitration provisions into 
their contracts.425 Due to this trend, the courts have been called upon 
to decide an increasing number of cases involving the application of 
such clauses in the context of injuries to employees of military con-
tractors.426 
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration provisions 
in employment contracts “involving commerce” are enforceable, ex-
cept “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.”427 The courts have given the enabling 
 
 423 Id. at 1142. 
 424 Id. at 1144 (internal citations omitted). 
 425 See, e.g., Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding arbitration provision in foreign seaman’s contract with Miami cruise 
line). 
 426 See id. 
 427 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
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“involving commerce” clause a broad application consistent with 
the reach of Congress’ power over interstate commerce.428 The ex-
ception limits the grounds upon which arbitration agreements may 
be invalidated to those “‘generally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that 
apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact 
that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”429 
Although Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act on its face 
exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees 
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce,”430 the Supreme Court has construed this provision to limit 
its application to such workers only while engaged in transportation 
employment activities.431 As a result, arbitration clauses in military 
contractor employment contracts are permissible, except in those 
circumstances where contracts in general would be voidable.432 
Typically, a two-step approach has been used by the courts in 
analyzing whether a particular controversy is subject to arbitra-
tion.433 The first step requires a determination of whether the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate the specific dispute.434 This question in turn 
has two sub-parts: “(1) is there a valid agreement to arbitrate the 
claims and (2) does the dispute in question fall within the scope of 
that arbitration agreement.”435 Where the answer to both of these 
questions is in the affirmative, the second step looks to whether there 
is any federal statute or public policy which would be violated by 
requiring arbitration of the particular claim.436 
 
 428 See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1984); Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967). 
 429 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 430 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 431 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). More recently, in 
New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, the Court held that the exclusion would apply regard-
less of whether the worker was an employee or independent contractor. 139 S.Ct. 
532, 543 (2019).  
 432 See generally Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 234–35 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
 433 Id. 
 434 Id. at 233–34. 
 435 Id. at 234. 
 436 Id. 
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Federal courts favor arbitration as a matter of public policy, gen-
erally holding that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”437 As a result, some 
courts have gone so far as to conclude “a valid agreement to arbitrate 
applies ‘unless it can be said with positive assurance that [the] arbi-
tration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would 
cover the dispute at issue.’”438 
Nevertheless, it has also generally been recognized that parties 
cannot be required to arbitrate controversies which they have not 
agreed to arbitrate and accordingly, “[e]ven though there is that pre-
sumption in favor of arbitration, ‘[t]he courts are not to twist the 
language of the contract to achieve a result which is favored by fed-
eral policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.’”439As a result, 
the question of whether claims brought by the employees of military 
contractors against their employers are subject to arbitration is de-
pendent upon the specific language of their employment contracts. 
In cases involving straightforward personal injury and wrongful 
death claims, the courts have generally upheld the enforceability of 
clauses containing the typical arbitration language.440 For example, 
in Nordan, which arose out of the grisly 2004 murders of four secu-
rity contractors in Fallujah, the district court granted Blackwater’s 
petition to compel arbitration where the families had sued the con-
tractor for negligence, reckless misconduct, and fraud in failing to 
properly train, arm, equip, support, and otherwise prepare their de-
cedents for the mission to which they had been assigned.441 Similar 
results have been reached in other tort cases.442 
 
 437 Id. at 235. 
 438 Id. (quoting Personal Sec. & Safety Sys., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 297 F.3d 
388, 392 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
 439 Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1419-20 (11th Cir. 
1990)). 
 440 Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC. v. Nordan, 2011 WL 237840 at *11 
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011). 
 441 Nordan, 2011 WL 237840 at *2. The contract required the arbitration of 
“any dispute regarding the interpretation or enforcement of any of the parties’ 
rights or obligations under this Agreement.” See Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Con-
sulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (E.D.N.C. 2005).  
 442 See, e.g., Coffey v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 2009 WL 2515649, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 13, 2009) (noting the employment contract required arbitration of “any 
and all claims that employee might have against the company . . . either (i) related 
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Where other types of claims have been involved, judicial treat-
ment has been mixed. For example, in Jones v. Halliburton Co., 
which involved the alleged gang rape of an employee by other co-
employees while stationed in Baghdad, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that some of the plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration, while 
others were not.443 
Following her arrival in Baghdad, the 20-year-old plaintiff was 
assigned to a predominately male barracks in the Green Zone and 
immediately began to complain about sexual harassment, claiming 
she was told by management to “go to the spa.”444 Several days later, 
Jones claimed that she was drugged and brutally raped by a number 
of Halliburton firefighters, while off duty after a social function in 
her barracks.445 
After what the plaintiff described as further harassment and mis-
handling of her resulting complaints by management, she filed a 
claim with the EEOC, which “credited [her] claim of sexual harass-
ment [and found] cause to believe that the Halliburton defendants 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”446 In addition, 
she also successfully asserted a claim for compensation benefits un-
der the DBA.447 
Subsequently, Jones filed a multi-count complaint against Hal-
liburton in the federal district court in Texas, seeking recovery under 
ten different theories: “negligence; negligent undertaking; sexual 
harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII; retalia-
tion; false imprisonment; breach of contract; fraud in the induce-
ment to enter the employment contract; fraud in the inducement to 
enter the arbitration agreement; assault and battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”448 
Halliburton moved to dismiss the suit and compel arbitration un-
der a clause in the plaintiff’s contract, which required the arbitration 
of “any and all claims that you might have against Employer related 
 
to their employment, including termination of employment, or (2) for personal 
injuries arising in the workplace . . .”). 
 443 Jones, 583 F.3d at 231–32, 242. 
 444 Jones v. Halliburton Company, 625 F. Supp. 2d 339, 343 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 445 Id. 
 446 Id. 
 447 Jones, 583 F.3d 228, 243. 
 448 Jones, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
2021] BLACKWATER RISING 237 
 
to your employment, including your termination, and any and all 
personal injury claims arising in the workplace . . . .”449 
While upholding the validity of the arbitration agreement, the 
district court concluded that the specific claims based upon assault 
and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent 
hiring, supervision, and retention; and false imprisonment did not 
arise out of Jones’ “scope of employment,” and were therefore not 
subject to arbitration.450 In reaching this conclusion the court ob-
served, “[a]lthough the arbitration provision extends to personal in-
jury claims arising in the workplace, the Court does not believe that 
Plaintiff’s bedroom should be considered the workplace, even 
though her housing was provided by her employer.”451 
The court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s prior ap-
plication for and receipt of benefits under the DBA estopped her 
from contending that these claims were outside the scope of her em-
ployment, since “[t]he Court does not believe that the liberal inter-
pretation of the term ‘scope of employment’ in the workers compen-
sation context can be incorporated wholesale into the interpretation 
of an arbitration provision.”452 
Although rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that the scope 
of the arbitration clause was to be determined by state, rather than 
federal law, the Fifth Circuit otherwise subsequently affirmed the 
district court’s rationale as well as its ultimate findings and hold-
ings.453 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit likewise rejected the conclu-
sion of another Texas district court in Barker v. Halliburton,454 
which had held that claims arising out of a sexual assault against 
another female employee of the same contractor in her quarters were 
subject to arbitration, since the perpetrator had allegedly violated the 
employer’s rules during the course of the attack.455 The Fifth Circuit 
 
 449 Id. at 343–44. 
 450 Id. at 354–55. 
 451 Id. at 353. See also Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1209 
1217–18 (11th Cir. 2011), which involved a purported rape of a crewmember 
aboard a cruise ship that relied heavily upon Jones to reach a similar result under 
a broader arbitration provision. 
 452 Jones, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
 453 Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 242 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 454 541 F. Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 455 Id. at 887, 889–90; Jones, 583 F.3d at 237–38. 
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concluded that such allegations were not enough to bring such an 
attack within the scope of the plaintiff’s employment.456 
Outside of the sexual assault context, however, arbitration pro-
visions have generally been upheld even in non-personal injury 
claims.457 For example, in McBride v. Halliburton Co.,458 an em-
ployee claimed that its employer had committed various fraudulent 
acts against the government under its LOCGAP contract for which 
the plaintiff was entitled to seek damages on behalf of the United 
States under the False Claims Act.459 The plaintiff further alleged 
that she was terminated in retaliation for acting as a whistleblower 
and thereafter subsequently falsely imprisoned.460 
The court concluded that all the claims were subject to arbitra-
tion under the terms of the plaintiff’s contract which provided for 
arbitration of “any matters with respect to” her employment, includ-
ing her termination and “any other matter related to or concerning 
the relationship between the Employee and the Company.”461 
One of the issues arising from the application of arbitration 
clauses is the impact of the inability of a plaintiff to be able to afford 
payment for the costs of such arbitration, which can be extremely 
high.462 The American Arbitration Association’s International Dis-
pute Resolution Division, which generally hears such claims, 
charges a sliding scale filing fee.463 For matters in which the plaintiff 
claims damages in the $1 million to $10 million range, the filing fee 
alone is presently $18,975.464 More significantly, however, are the 
fees of the arbitrators, who are typically experienced attorneys 
 
 456 Jones, 583 F.3d at 237–38. 
 457 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., No. 05-00828(HHK)., 
2007 WL 1954441, at *1 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007). 
 458 Id. 
 459 Id. 31 U.S.C. §3729 et seq. permits a private individual to bring a claim on 
behalf of themselves and the government. The complaint is initially filed under 
seal and if the government decides, after investigating the claim, that it does not 
wish to pursue it, the private party then may proceed forward with the litigation. 
 460 U.S. ex rel. McBride, 2007 WL 1954441, at *1. 
 461 Id. at *5. 
 462 International Arbitration Fee Schedule, INT’L CTR. DISP. RESOL. 1 (Oct. 1, 
2017), go.sdr.org/internationalfeeschedule. 
 463 Id. 
 464 Id. The fee is paid in two installments, $8,625 initially and $10,350 prior 
to the first hearing. Id.  
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charging anywhere from $400 to $1000 per hour.465 Since some ar-
bitration agreements call for a panel of three arbitrators, the hourly 
fees can become tripled.466 
In the commercial context, corporations can make their own 
analysis as to the affordability of such fees as part of their contract 
negotiations and decide whether to enter into such agreements. The 
normal employee of a military contractor, however, generally has 
no such bargaining power. Typically, the injured employee or his 
family, in the case of a wrongful death claim, rarely is able to bear 
such costs, especially after the loss of the family’s major breadwin-
ner.467 
Several courts have held out the possibility that arbitration can 
be challenged where its costs would be prohibitively expensive for 
the plaintiff to be able to obtain redress for its statutory remedies.468 
To avoid this problem, some employers have agreed to pay for the 
costs of arbitration as part of their employment contract.469 How-
ever, even where the contract calls for the splitting of the arbitration 
costs, the threshold for proving such a defense has rendered it nearly 
illusory as evidenced by a series of Eleventh Circuit cases dealing 
with the analogous arbitration of seamen’s contracts.470 
This defense has not fared any better in military contractor cases. 
In the long running Nordan case, the district court granted Blackwa-
ter’s petition to compel arbitration in 2007.471 The employment con-
tract required that the arbitration be conducted before the American 
 
 465 See Deborah Rothman, Trends in Arbitrator Compensation, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 1, 1 (2017) available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/spring2017/3_rothman_trends_in_ar-
bitrator.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 466 International Arbitration Fee Schedule, supra note 462, at 2. 
 467 See, e.g., Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 
2011 WL237840, at *2, *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011). 
 468 See Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., 346 F.3d 1024, 1029 (11th Cir. 
2003); Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279, 1291–92 
(11th Cir. 2015); Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 545 (11th Cir. 
2016). 
 469 See, e.g., Anders, 346 F.3d at 1029. 
 470 See Escobar, 805 F.3d at 1283 (holding that a seaman, who filed an affi-
davit indicating that he was unemployed and had $0 in the bank, and thus could 
not pay half of the anticipated arbitration fees of $20,000, failed to meet his bur-
den to establish this defense); Suazo, 822 F.3d at 545. 
 471 Blackwater Sec. Consulting, 2011 WL 237840, at *2. 
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Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which as noted above has rather 
substantial fees for both filing in the first instance and the ongoing 
payment of its arbitrators.472 
The attorney for the deceased contractors’ families initially filed 
a hardship request with the AAA requesting that it waive its filing 
fee on the grounds that his clients could not afford to pay it.473 The 
AAA instead offered to defer payment of the filing fee until the end 
of the case, to which the families agreed.474 Subsequently, the AAA 
issued bills for the payment of its arbitrators’ fees.475 Following the 
indication by the families’ counsel that they could not afford these 
fees, Blackwater initially paid them, however, later refused to pay 
subsequent fee requests over the next few years.476 As a result, the 
AAA  refused to go forward with the arbitration, eventually dismiss-
ing the claims and bringing the case to a premature conclusion.477 
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
A. Under Iraqi Law 
On May 16, 2003, Coalition Administrator Paul Bremer adopted 
the original Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) Regula-
tions.478 Regulation number 1 vested the powers of government for 
the administration of Iraq in the CPA as well as “all executive, 
 
 472 The initial filing fee at the time was $13,500. See id. at *2, *6. 
 473 Id. at *3. 
 474 Id. 
 475 Id. 
 476 Id. 
 477 Id. 
 478 The CPA’ s authority derived from the status of the United States and Great 
Britain as occupying powers as acknowledged in UN Security Council Resolution 
1483, adopted on May 22, 2003. See JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., OCCUPYING IRAQ: 
A HISTORY OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 12 (2009), available at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_ MG84
7.pdf. The CPA governed Iraq from May 2003 to June 28, 2004. The CPA Ad-
ministrator, Paul Bremer, was appointed by President Bush and Secretary of De-
fense Rumsfield. See U.S. ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC., 562 F.3d 
295, 298 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objec-
tives . . . .”479 
Pursuant to this grant of authority, Administrator Bremer subse-
quently adopted revised CPA Order Number 17, which provided 
that all contractors and their employees working under contract with 
the CPA “shall be immune from Iraqi legal process.”480 Under this 
order, such contractors and their employees would, however, still be 
subject to jurisdiction of the country which sent them.481 
As a result, neither military contractors or their employees may 
be legally held liable for violation of Iraq’s criminal laws, nor tried 
in an Iraqi court.482 
B. Under U.S. Law 
Although CPA Order Number 17 immunizes contractors and 
their employees from the reach of Iraqi law, it still subjects them to 
the jurisdiction of the country which sent them.483 Therefore, to the 
extent that the home county has criminal jurisdiction for acts occur-
ring in either Iraq or Afghanistan, contractors and their employees 
may still be subject to criminal process under such laws.484 
In earlier wars, civilians that accompanied American forces 
overseas had been subject to military court-martial for crimes com-
mitted in their host countries.485 This practice was codified by the 
adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, which 
provided for the jurisdiction of military courts over: 
(10) In time of declared war or a contingency oper-
ation, persons serving with or accompanying an 
armed force in the field. 
 
 479 COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., DEP’T OF DEF., CPA/REG/16 MAY2003/01, 
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (2003). 
 480 COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., DEP’T OF DEF., CPA/ORD/27 JUNE2004/17, 
STATUS OF CPA, MNFI, CERTAIN MISSIONS AND PERSONNEL IN IRAQ W/AMEX 
**REVISED** (2004). 
 481 Id. at Section 3(1). 
 482 See id. 
 483 Id. 
 484 Id. at Section 2(4). 
 485 See, e.g., In re Varney’s Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190, 200–01 (S.D. Cal. 
1956) (and cases cited therein); see also Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28, 35 (4th Cir. 
1919). 
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(11) . . . persons serving with, employed by, or ac-
companying the armed forces outside the United 
States . . . . 
(12) . . . persons within an area leased by or other-
wise reserved or acquired for the use of the United 
States which is under the control of the Secretary 
concerned and which is outside the United 
States . . . .486 
In 1957, however, the Supreme Court held in Reid v. Covert that 
military court-martial for capital cases stemming from crimes oc-
curring outside of the United States in times of peace, improperly 
deprived civilian dependents of servicemen of their constitutionally 
protected rights.487 Three years later, in Kinsella v. Singleton, the 
Court expanded its holding in Reid to include noncapital crimes 
committed by civilian dependents488 In two more cases that year, the 
Court applied these holdings to civilian employees that were U.S. 
citizens.489 
Following these decisions, many crimes committed thereafter 
fell into a “jurisdictional vacuum” as a result of the then-existing 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal 
statutes, and the reluctance of many host countries to prosecute 
crimes that did not involve their own citizens.490 
 
 486 10 U.S.C. § 802 (emphasis added). In 2007, subsection 10 was changed 
from “[i]n time of war” to “[i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation” 
in order to nullify the decision by the United States Court of Military Appeals in 
United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (C.M.A. 1970), which held that a 
civilian employee of an Army contractor in Vietnam could not be court-martialed 
because the conflict was not a declared war. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 
262 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
 487 354 U.S. 1, 4–5, 19 (1957). Reid involved two consolidated convictions 
against the wives of service members stationed overseas during peacetime that 
were found guilty of murdering their spouses. 
 488 Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960). 
 489 See Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (finding civilian em-
ployee of the Corps of Engineers guilty of capital crime reversed); see also 
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (finding 
civilian employees of Army and Air Force guilty of noncapital charges reversed). 
 490 U.S. v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
2021] BLACKWATER RISING 243 
 
To address this “vacuum,” Congress adopted the Military Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (“MEJA”),491 which extended 
federal criminal jurisdiction, just in time for the Iraq and Afghani-
stan wars.492 Initially, the MEJA only applied to extraterritorial 
crimes committed by civilians493 employed by the Department of 
Defense or its contractors.494 Following the Abu Ghraib torture 
scandal, which involved contractors working for the Department of 
the Interior, it was amended to reach contractors and their employ-
ees working for all agencies supporting the war effort, so long as 
their actions at the time of the purported crime “relate[d] to support-
ing a DOD mission.”495 
Although there was originally some debate among commenta-
tors over whether the MEJA could extend the reach of United States 
criminal law to cover actions by civilian contractors in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan,496 the circuit courts that subsequently considered the is-
sue have found such jurisdiction to exist.497 
One such highly publicized criminal case involved the Septem-
ber 16, 2007, shootout by Blackwater security personnel, which 
 
 491 18 U.S.C. § 3261. 
 492 18 U.S.C. § 3261. 
 493 The Act applies to servicemen who commit crimes while a member of the 
Armed Forces but cease to be subject to military law at the time of being charged. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d). 
 494 Slatten, 865 F.3d at 779. 
 495 Id. at 779–80 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3267). 
 496 See Anthony Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Vi-
olations of the Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
699 (2007); Andrew Fallon & Theresa Keene, Closing the Legal Loophole? Prac-
tical Implications of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 A.F. 
L. REV. 271 (2001); Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case 
for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 
2006 BYU L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 497 See Slatten, 865 F.3d at 767, 777 (D.C. Cir.) (upholding the convictions of 
Blackwater security guards for charges arising from the killing and wounding of 
31 Iraq civilians in Baghdad); United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 552 (4th Cir. 
2012) (upholding indictment against South African national employed by 
DynaCorp for assault of British citizen at military airbase in Afghanistan); United 
States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 653 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding a conviction of for-
mer serviceman for crimes committed in Iraq prior to his discharge under MEJA); 
see also United States v. Williams, 509 F. App’x 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2013) (up-
holding constitutionality of prosecution under MEJA for crimes committed by ci-
vilian spouse against his daughter while in Japan and Okinawa). 
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resulted in the deaths of fourteen Iraqi civilians and the wounding 
of twenty others, as discussed in the Introduction.498 While provid-
ing security protection for a State Department official traveling from 
a meeting site back to the Green Zone, four of the Blackwater per-
sonnel got into a firefight at a street intersection, claiming that they 
were attacked first.499 Two days after the incident, the security per-
sonnel provided written statements to the Department of State based 
upon assurances that neither the statements, nor any information de-
rived from the statements, would be used against them.500 Following 
various investigations by the State Department, Army, and FBI, fed-
eral prosecutors concluded that the shooting was an “unprovoked 
illegal attack”501 and a federal grand jury in Washington D.C. sub-
sequently handed down indictments against the security personnel 
for manslaughter.502 
The indictments were initially dismissed by the district court on 
the grounds that the defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights had been 
violated by the impact of the compelled statements.503 The dismis-
sals were subsequently reversed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which concluded that the district court had failed to conduct 
a proper independent source analysis to determine whether suffi-
cient non-tainted evidence existed to prosecute the security person-
nel.504 
Following the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court,505 new 
superseding indictments were handed down, and as a result, in an 
 
 498 United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112,116 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 499 Id. at 116. 
 500 Id. at 118–19. 
 501 Sari Horwitz, New Charges Brought Against Former Blackwater Guards 
in Baghdad Shooting, WASH. POST: NAT’L SEC. (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-charges-brought-
against-former-blackwater-guards-in-baghdad-shooting/2013/10/17. 
 502 Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16. 
 503 Id. 
 504 United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This opinion 
only applied to four of the five guards originally charged as the government 
moved to dismiss the indictment against Nicholas Slatten without prejudice to 
seek a later re-indictment. Slatten was later reindicted and convicted of murder; 
see also Matt Apuzzo, Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwa-
ter-verdict.html. 
 505 United States v. Slough, 566 U.S. 1043 (2012). 
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October 2014 trial, one of the guards was found guilty of first degree 
murder and three others of manslaughter and weapons charges.506 
Slatten, the guard convicted of murder, was sentenced to life impris-
onment and each of the others to 30 years in prison.507  Although 
Slatten’s original conviction was vacated for failure to sever his case 
from the others,508 he was subsequently convicted a second time.509 
The cases were finally closed over 12 years after they started, when 
the four guards were pardoned in December of 2020 by President 
Trump as part of his highly controversial deluge of pardons on his 
way out of office.510 
Another potential avenue for exerting U.S. criminal jurisdiction 
is found in the War Crimes Act, which applies to both members of 
the Armed Forces and U.S. nationals. 511Under the Act, jurisdiction 
exists to prosecute various “war crimes,” which are defined as 
“grave breach[es]” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,512 as well as 
violations of specific portions of the 1907 Hague Convention.513 
In 2006, Congress amended the Act to exclude “foreign or inter-
national” law as sources for determining prohibited conduct and 
 
 506 Matt Apuzzo, supra note 504. 
 507 Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-black-
water-guards-sentenced-to-prison-in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-civilians.html. The 
sentences for the three guards convicted of manslaughter were subsequently re-
duced to between 12 and 15 years. See Ashraf Khalil, Sentences Reduced for 3 
Blackwater Guards from 2007 Iraq Massacre, MIL. TIMES: PENTAGON & CONG. 
(Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/
09/08/sentences-reduced-for-3-blackwater-guards-from-2007-iraq-massacre/. 
 508 United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 509 United States v. Slatten, 395 F. Supp. 3d 45, 116 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 510 See Haberman & Schmidt, supra note 69. 
 511 18 U.S.C. § 2441. 
 512 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Rel-
ative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287. 
 513 1907 Hague Convention IV with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land (With Annexed Regulations) art. 23, art. 25, art. 27, art. 28, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV]. 
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then went on to identify specific acts that would form a basis for 
jurisdiction.514 The conduct identified by Congress under these con-
ventions giving rise to jurisdiction consists of torture, murder, mu-
tilation and maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, 
rape, sexual assault, taking hostages, and performing biological ex-
periments.515 The 2006 Amendment also gave the President “the au-
thority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application 
of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and 
administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which 
are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.”516 
Another basis for American courts to exercise jurisdiction for 
extra-territorial crimes is the Anti-Torture Statute.517 This statute 
applies to acts of torture as defined in the Act, which are performed 
outside of the United States by either citizens or foreign nationals 
who are then arrested within this country.518 The Act does not pro-
vide a basis for private civil remedies, only criminal prosecution.519 
CONCLUSION 
Although the military has used civilian contractors in every ma-
jor conflict from the Revolutionary War to the present, their role and 
duties have evolved dramatically over the years. These changes have 
been spurred by many factors, including advances in technology and 
the resulting redirection of resources away from human warriors, 
political decisions to reduce the military budget and standing army 
strength following the end of the Cold War, the elimination of the 
draft, and changes in the nature of war itself. Perhaps one of the most 
 
 514 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 
2600. 
 515 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d). 
 516 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 
2600. 
 517 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A. This statute implemented the United States’ 
obligations as a signatory of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). Al 
Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 518 Id. at § 2340A. 
 519 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Renkel v. United 
States, 456 F.3d 640, 644–45 (6th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Victor, 337 F. App’x 239, 
241 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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significant factors has been the underlying political philosophy of 
privatization of government functions, which has characterized both 
Republican and Democratic administrations over the past two dec-
ades.520 
As a result, civilian contractors now fulfill many functions that 
were previously performed by military personnel, which has re-
sulted in the deployment of their employees to more forward battle-
field positions than ever before.521 The exposure of private civilians 
to greater risks of harm has also been enhanced by the increasing 
use of contractors to provide security forces for everything from the 
guarding of military bases to the protection of U.S. State Department 
officials and even Iraqi cabinet members.522 
This redefinition of the civilians’ role in the U.S. military war 
effort has raised many new legal issues for which there is often a 
lack of established relevant precedent. As previously discussed, 
much of the existing case law was developed during World War II 
and the Vietnam conflict, in which civilians played dramatically 
smaller and more isolated roles than in recent war efforts.523 
As a result, certain legal principles have developed in historical 
contexts, which are sometimes hard to reconcile with today’s war-
fare environment. For example, the continued rationale for utilizing 
the LHWCA to govern claims arising out of the wars in Afghanistan, 
which is a landlocked mountainous country, and Iraq, a country with 
vast deserts and a mere 36 miles of coastline, are hard to justify.524 
The use of the LHWCA to decide claims arising out of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan is largely the result of a historical accident, 
stemming from the development of the Defense Base Act in World 
War II in response to the needs created by President Roosevelt’s 
Lend-Lease Program with Great Britain. As such, the LHWCA pro-
vides a relatively modest schedule of benefits for injured workers, 
comparable to those provided by state workers compensation 
acts.525 
 
 520 See Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 1–2; SCAHILL, supra note 12, at 61: 
Urey, supra note 2, at 4; Campbell, supra note 15. 
 521 PETERS & PLAGAKIS, supra note 27, at 4. 
 522 Id. 
 523 Campbell, supra note 15. 
 524 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq. 
 525 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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Although longshoring work is hardly easy, the risks and types of 
injuries to which the typical longshoreman is exposed certainly do 
not compare to the hazards of working in a wartime environment 
with enemy troops and insurgents trying to kill or maim opposition 
workers, not to mention the perils posed by friendly fire and weapon 
systems’ malfunctions.526 As noted by one military author, due to 
the “asymmetric threat on [today’s] nonlinear battlefield, there is no 
‘safe’ zone within the area of operation”527 for contractors. 
Even in the context of the relatively safer work environment, the 
LHWCA also gives longshoremen a much broader ability to sue 
non-employer third parties for negligently inflicted injuries than are 
available to the employees of military contractors, who must con-
tend with political question, government contractor, combatant ac-
tivities exception and government secret defenses.528 
Due to the lack of established relevant common law predicate 
coupled with the absence of any comprehensive Congressional treat-
ment of these issues, the district courts have been left to struggle 
with many new and complex questions raised by these changed ci-
vilian roles, relationships and functions without much of a frame-
work for guidance. Consequently, many cases have reached diamet-
rically opposite results that are often not logically capable of recon-
ciliation.529 
Take for example the unfortunately too common convoy am-
bush, which has produced many of the claims arising out of these 
recent conflicts.530 A civilian employee in the convoy operated by 
 
 526 See generally In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478; White v. Raytheon Co., No. 
07–10222–RGS, 2008 WL 5273290, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008) (dismissing 
a suit by wife of Navy pilot shot down in a friendly fire incident while on patrol 
in Iraq by a defective Patriot missile where application of state secrets doctrine 
deprived the manufacturer of necessary information to establish its claimed de-
fenses). 
 527 Campbell, supra note 15. 
 528 See 33 U.S.C. § 933(a). For a detailed discussion of such rights, see Robert 
D. Peltz & Andrew L. Waks, Personal Injury and Wrongful Death of Seamen and 
Other Maritime Workers, FLORIDA MARITIME LAW AND PRACTICE §3.4A (Florida 
Bar, 6th Ed. 2019). 
 529  Compare Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2008), with  
Whitaker v. KBR, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1281–82 (M.D. Ga. 2006). 
 530 See Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805 
(E.D.N.C. 2005). 
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his employer is limited to the relatively modest schedule of benefits 
provided by the LHWCA.531 Another civilian employee of a differ-
ent contractor riding in the same convoy can bring a claim for all 
damages allowed under the tort laws of the state where the operating 
contractor is headquartered.532 Similarly, an army soldier injured in 
the same convoy would also have the right to bring a state law claim 
against the contractor.533 
That is, of course, assuming that the plaintiff is lucky enough to 
avoid getting one of the judges, who have applied the political ques-
tion doctrine, government contractor defense, or combatant activi-
ties exception to such claims.534 Even after navigating these shoals 
there is always the unpredictable application of the state secrets doc-
trine.535 
As a result, the answers to questions—such as the application of 
the political question doctrine, the parameters of the government 
contractor defense, the validity and scope of the combatant activities 
exception, the extension of sovereign immunity to private entities 
and the limitations imposed on the application of the state secrets 
doctrine—often seem to rely too much on the luck of the draw in 
getting a judge with the right political philosophy, rather than exist-
ing legal precedent. 
If there was ever an area of overwhelmingly unique federal in-
terest, it is the subject of military contractors’ legal liabilities and 
responsibilities. As aptly described by one commentator, 
Never has there been such a reliance on nonmilitary 
members to accomplish tasks directly affecting the 
tactical success of an engagement . . . the military is 
facing a fundamental change in the way it conducts 
 
 531 See generally Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 532 See generally Potts v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (M.D. Ala. 
2006). 
 533 See generally Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 
2006 WL 3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006). 
 534 See Whitaker v. Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1278 n. 
1 (M.D.Ga. 2006). 
 535 Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1487, 1487, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 
1993). 
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warfare, and there is little evidence that the players 
have been adequately prepared for that change.536 
This is clearly an area that calls out for a comprehensive Con-
gressional solution. The present patchwork quilt of remedies is nei-
ther adequate nor fair and is lacking the predictability that the law 
should provide to its citizens, especially those who are called upon 
to risk their lives for the defense of their country. 
Accordingly, the only rational solution is for Congress to step in 
and create a unified system of recovery, which is relevant to the 
modern battlefield and the risks and dangers to which the employees 
of today’s contractors are exposed. Whether it is to permit tort dam-
age claims to go forward to be tried before either a judge or jury or 
whether it is to create a realistic schedule of workers compensation 
type benefits, a single comprehensive system covering all military 
contractors and their employees working on the battlefield is neces-
sary to provide both the predictability and fairness necessary under 
the law. 
 
 536 Turner & Norton, supra note 3, at 3. 
